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COMMENTS
Urinalysis Drug Testing of Private
Employees: A Call for Legislation in
Pennsylvania
If we choose to violate the rights of the innocent in order to
discover and act against the guilty, then we will have trans-
formed our country into a police state and abandoned one of the
fundamental tenets of our free society. In order to win the war
against drugs, we must not sacrifice the life of the Constitution
in the battle.1
I. Introduction
Drug abuse in America has been called "the biggest threat that
we ever had to our national security ' 2 and "[a]n epidemic as perva-
sive and as dangerous in its way as the plagues of medieval times."8
Public opinion polls show that it now surpasses economic problems
and the threat of war as the nation's top concern.' Hardly a day goes
by without a media report on some aspect of our country's "war on
drugs." 5 One of the measures currently taken to combat drug abuse
is drug testing,6 and more specifically, urinalysis testing.7 Seen by
I. Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1511 (D. N.J. 1986). For a discussion
of Capua, see infra notes 148-71 and accompanying text.
2. Defense Demurs, TIME, Sept. 29, 1986, at 36 (quoting U.S. Congressman E. Clay
Shaw, Republican-Fla.).
3. Smith, The Drug Crisis, NEWSWEEK, June 16, 1986, at 15.
4. See Thomas, America's Crusade, TIME, Sept. 15, 1986, at 61.
5. See. e.g., America on Drugs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 28, 1986, at 48; Drug
Bill signed by Reagan, Phila. Inquirer, Oct. 28, 1986, at 3-A, col. 6; Drugs: The Enemy
Within, TIME, Sept. 15, 1986, at 58; Morganthau, Crack and Crime, NEWSWEEK, June 16,
1986, at 16. The television networks have also reported extensively on the problem: ABC high-
lighted "Drugs in America" on all of its news programs during a week in September 1986; a
CBS report entitled 48 Hours on Crack Street drew the highest viewership of a network docu-
mentary in six years; and NBC aired over 400 reports on the drug problem in a recent seven-
month period. See also Henry, Reporting the Drug Problem, TIME, Oct. 6, 1986, at 73 (ques-
tioning whether the media has over-reported the drug problem); Tharp, Oregonians, Bucking
Anti-Drug Trend in Nation, Put Pot Initiative on Ballot, Wall St. J., Oct. 1, 1986, at 68, col.
1.
6. While drug testing may seem synonymous with urine testing, it actually encompasses
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many as one idea that offers real hope in containing the use of illegal
drugs, urinalysis is used to test such diverse groups as sports figures,'
school children, 9 teachers, 10 military personnel, 1 prisoners, 2 and in-
dividuals in the workplace.' 3
Drug testing in the workplace is becoming an increasingly com-
mon occurrence." While public employees 5 find protection from un-
several types of tests used to detect drug use. In addition to urine, the following are purported
to be able to show drug use: blood, saliva, hair, and brain waves. BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS,
ALCOHOL & DRUGS IN THE WORKPLACE: COSTS, CONTROLS, AND CONTROVERSIES 31 (1986)
[hereinafter ALCOHOL & DRUGS]. The focus of this Comment is urinalysis drug testing in the
workplace.
7. See infra notes 30-45 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Drug Testing at Wimbledon, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1986, at 5, col. 3; see
also [National Football League Commissioner] Rozelle's Drug Plan Thrown Out, Phila. In-
quirer, Oct. 28, 1986, at I-E, col. 2.
9. See, e.g., Vrazo, School Drug-Testing Plan Sparks Debate, Phila. Inquirer, Oct. 5,
1986, at 2-A, col. I. For a legal challenge to the testing of school students, see Odenheim v.
Carlstadt-East Rutherford Regional School Dist., 211 N.J. Super. 54, 510 A.2d 709 (1985)
(school's drug testing policy violated the reasonable privacy expectations of school children).
See also Note, Dragnet Drug Testing in Public Schools and the Fourth Amendment, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 852 (1986) (suggesting that blanket urinalysis of school children is permissi-
ble only in the most extreme and compelling of circumstances).
10. See Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 119 A.D.2d 35,
505 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1986) (compulsory urinalysis testing of public school teachers without rea-
sonable suspicion as to drug use by individual tested violates fourth amendment).
II. See Committee for G.I. Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (war-
rantless drug testing of military personnel was constitutionally permissible); National Fed'n of
Fed. Employees v. Weinberger, 122 L.R.R.M. 3351 (BNA) (D. D.C. June 23, 1986). In
Weinberger, the court refused to enjoin a testing program of civilian employees, stating that
the Civil Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (1978), provided the exclusive remedial frame-
work for the issues raised. The court noted, however, that the testing program raised "substan-
tial" fourth amendment concerns. See also Abney, Drug Abuse, Courts-Martial, and Random
Urinalysis - An Unworkable Combination, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. I (1985) (challenging drug
abuse courts-martial based solely on a random urinalysis).
12. See Wykoffv. Resig, 613 F. Supp. 1504 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (urinalysis drug testing of
inmates is permissible but must comport with due process); Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp.
1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (fourth amendment did not bar urinalysis drug testing of inmates con-
ducted in a reasonable manner). See also United States v. Williams, 787 F.2d 1182 (7th Cir.
1986) (urinalysis drug testing as a condition of probation did not violate fourth amendment).
13. See F.A.A. Workers Are Cleared in Inquiry on Drug Use, N.Y. Times, Aug. 29,
1986, at B4, col. I; GE. Kodak to Screen for Drug Use, Wash. Post, Sept. 4, 1986, at Dl, col.
3; GM to Propose to UAW On-the-Job Drug Testing, Wall St. J., Oct. 6, 1986, at 59, col. 1.;
Lindsey, Worker Drug Testing Provoking Debate; Spreading Programs Assailed as Violating
Constitution, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1986, at I, col. 3: Panel Says No to TMI Drug Tests,
Phila. Inquirer, Oct. 10, 1986, at I-B, col. I; Paolantonio, For Candidates, a New Challenge
- Campaigns Enlist Drug Testing, Phila. Inquirer, Oct. 5, 1986, at 2-E, col. 1.
14. In 1982, only three percent of the Fortune 500 companies had drug testing programs
in place. By 1985, this figure was nearly thirty percent. ALCOHOL & DRUGS, supra note 6, at
27. One estimate places the number of drug tests conducted in the United States in 1986 at
two million. See Freedberg, Drug Testing Spurs Market for Untainted Urine, Phila. Inquirer,
Oct. 30, 1986, at 22-A, col. 1. See generally ALCOHOL & DRUGS, supra note 6; P. BENSINGER,
DRUGS IN THE WORKPLACE: EMPLOYER'S RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES (1984) [hereinafter
P. BENSINGER].
15. For purposes of this Comment, this classification includes federal, state and local
government employees, as well as other individuals subjected to drug testing by a governmen-
tal body.
DRUG TESTING
reasonable drug testing under the ambit of the fourth amendment,"
private employees1 7 have little, if any, protection against identical
testing. In the absence of specific legislation,18 private employees
may find themselves subjected to random, mandatory testing, with-
out any probable cause or reasonable suspicion.19 Refusal to take a
test may result in immediate dismissal, 0 with such dismissal often
immune from legal challenge."'
This Comment will examine drug testing in the workplace, be-
ginning with a comparison of the relative interests of the employer
and the employee. The methods of testing and their accuracy are
discussed, as is evolving federal case law concerning drug testing.
The Comment then explores possible avenues of protection for pri-
vate employees in Pennsylvania and concludes with a proposal for
legislation that protects the rights of private employees in Pennsylva-
nia against unreasonable drug testing.
16. The fourth amendment provides as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
17. For purposes of this Comment, this classification consists of nongovernmental em-
ployees not represented by a union. By virtue of a union contract or collective bargaining
agreement, union employees will often be able to restrict drug testing by an employer. This
category of nongovernmental, nonunion employees constitutes a clear majority of the
workforce in both Pennsylvania and the United States. PA. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1985 PENN-
SYLVANIA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 64 (1985); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1986, at 424 (1986).
18. Legislation to regulate drug testing is under consideration in several states. Public
hearings on workplace drug testing have been held in Pennsylvania and several legislators are
considering introducing such legislation in the near future. See Drug Testing: Public Hearings
Before the Pennsylvania House Labor Relations Committee, 170th Gen. Assembly, 1986 Ses-
sion [hereinafter Hearings]. Legislation is also under consideration in California, Maine, and
New Jersey. Drug testing bills introduced in Massachusetts and Oregon during 1985 were
defeated. See ALCOHOL & DRUGS, supra note 6, at 75. The City of San Francisco enacted
drug testing legislation covering private employees in 1985; see infra Appendix for excerpts of
this law.
19. The courts, on fourth amendment grounds, have generally disapproved of random or
en masse drug testing in the public sector. See infra text accompanying notes 173-81. The
fourth amendment does not apply to testing by private employers, however, and many private
employers have programs which require all employees to submit to testing. See, e.g., ALCOHOL
& DRUGS, supra note 6, at 89, 107 (discussing private employers who test current employees
without regard to suspicion); Waldholz, Drug Testing in the Workplace: Whose Rights Take
Precedence?, Wall St. J., Nov. I1, 1986, at 39, col. 4 (discussing a mandatory testing program
instituted at a New York-based investment banking firm).
20. See, e.g.. Man Awarded Jobless Pay After Refusing Drug Test, Harrisburg Patriot,
Oct. 8, 1986, at -, col. - (private employee was fired for refusing to submit to drug
test).
21. See infra notes 263-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of the employment-
at-will doctrine in Pennsylvania.
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II. Background Information
A. Competing Interests of the Employer and Employee
Two primary factors have led employers to institute urinalysis
drug testing in the workplace. First and foremost is the economic
impact of substance abuse on the employer. The financial costs of
employee substance abuse stem from increased health care needs,
work-related accidents, absenteeism, and a decline in worker produc-
tivity.22 A second factor often mentioned by employers in justifying
drug testing is safety. Drug use may pose safety risks for the individ-
ual employee and, depending on the nature of the employee's job,
directly jeopardize the safety of fellow employees and the public at
large."3
From the employee's point of view, however, drug testing by an
employer is often viewed as an unwarranted invasion of privacy.24
22. The estimates of the dollar amounts of such losses vary widely, and some question
their accuracy. Several recent estimates of productivity losses from drug abuse range from
eight billion to thirty-three billion dollars a year. Economic losses in Pennsylvania related to
substance abuse were estimated to total $6.4 billion in 1984. ALCOHOL & DRUGS, supra note
6, at 7-8; P. BENSINGER, supra note 14, at iii. Whatever the actual losses from drug abuse,
there is little doubt that alcohol-related losses far outweigh them. Arguably, employers would
likely reap greater financial benefits from programs dealing with alcohol abuse rather than
drug abuse. The degrees to which society "accepts" the use of these substances is, no doubt, a
significant factor in the disparate treatment given them by some employers. A growing number
of employers, however, are instituting programs that deal with all forms of substance abuse.
See ALCOHOL & DRUGS, supra note 6, at 39-58 (discussing "employee assistance programs"
and other employee-employer developments).
23. See, e.g., Everett v. Napper, 632 F. Supp. 1481 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (drug use among
fire fighters could threaten safety of the community); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp.
482 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (drug use among city employees working in electrical distribution facility
constituted a threat to safety of the community); but see Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp.
1500 (D. D.C. 1986) (public safety would not be significantly threatened by drug use of school
bus attendant who did not drive or maintain buses).
Other reasons suggested as justifying employee testing include the following: the fact that
employers are frequently held liable for the negligent actions of their employees; concern over
the security of property and information belonging to the employer; and the belief that an
employee's conduct outside the workplace is a valid concern of the employer. Lehr & Mid-
dlebrooks, Work-Place Privacy Issues and Employer Screening Policies, II EMPL. REL. L.J.
407, 408 (1985-86) [hereinafter Lehr & Middlebrooks].
The federal government has urged both public and private employers to consider adoption
of a drug testing program for job applicants and current employees. See PRESIDENT'S COMMIS-
SION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, AMERICA'S HABIT: DRUG ABUSE. DRUG TRAFFICKING, AND OR-
GANIZED CRIME 485 (1986). Attorney General Edwin Meese has suggested that employers
help in the drug campaign by undertaking " 'surveillance of problem areas such as locker
rooms, parking lots and nearby taverns if necessary.'" Testing the Waters, TIME, Nov. 10,
1986, at 35.
24. One employee who was forced to submit to urinalysis testing under surveillance de-
scribed it as the most humiliating experience of her life. Hearings. supra note 18, at 8 (July
23, 1986, 1:30 p.m.). A union member who was not reappointed to a civil service position upon
refusal to submit to urine testing commented on such testing as follows: "I look at it this
way[:] today urine samples, tomorrow blood tests and the next day . . . brain scans, and
maybe next week it will be lobotomies." Id. at 45. But see ALCOHOL & DRUGS, supra note 6,
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Urination is traditionally a private act, 5 and under normal circum-
stances people simply do not expect that someone will attempt to
gather and analyze their body fluids, much less observe the act. 6 It
is also argued that what an employee does outside the workplace
should be none of the employer's concern.27 In addition to the pri-
vacy concerns, some employees object to testing because it is an af-
front to their dignity.2 8 Challenges by public employees to workplace
drug testing programs usually are resolved only after careful balanc-
ing by the courts of the competing interests of employer and em-
ployee;29 private employers are free to decide that their interests out-
weigh employee's privacy interests.
B. Testing Methodology and Related Concerns
Most organizations utilizing drug testing send urine samples to
private laboratories for analysis.30 Two types of tests are used by the
laboratories to detect the presence of illegal drugs in urine. The first
type, known as a "screening" test,3 1 is used to identify those samples
of urine that contain drugs.3 2 The second type, known as a "confir-
matory" test,33 is more accurate and is used to confirm the result of
at 37 (citing a USA Today telephone poll which found that 77 percent of the respondents said
they would not object to being tested).
25. As the court noted in Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1514 (D. N.J.
1986), facilities both inside and outside the home recognize this privacy tradition, and society
generally condemns the act in public.
26. For a discussion of why some consider body surveillance essential in administering
urine tests, see note 40 and accompanying text.
27. But see supra note 23.
28. See Thompson, Most Law Firms Resist Worker Drug Tests, PA. LAW J. RPTR.,
Sept. 15, 1986, supp. at 8, col. 2.
29. See. e.g., Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1513-14 (D. N.J. 1986);
Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1508 (D. D.C. 1986).
30. Drug tests sales in the United States are expected to reach $80 million in 1986.
Medical Diagnostics Inc., a subsidiary of Keystone Medical Corporation, planned to market an
on-site test in late 1986. Sims, Boom in Drug Tests Expected, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1986, at
D-1, col. 4.
31. The two most widely used screening tests are: the enzyme-multiplied immunoassay
test, manufactured as EMIT by Syva Co., Palo Alto, California; and the radioimmunoassay
(RIA), of which the most frequently used is Abuscreen, manufactured by Roche Diagnostics,
Nutley, New Jersey. Hanson, Drug Abuse Testing Programs Gaining Acceptance in Work-
place, 64 CHEM. & ENG. NEws 7, 9 (June 2, 1986). The EMIT test employs two chemical
reagents, that is, substances used to detect or measure another substance. The reagents are
mixed with the urine sample and then placed in a spectrometer, which measures the amount of
light energy that is absorbed in the chemical reaction. The degree of absorption indicates
which drug is involved. The RIA uses radioactive materials to identify the chemicals in the
sample. Sims, supra note 30, at D-21, col. 3. Screening tests typically cost two to ten dollars
each. Id.; ALCOHOL & DRUGS, supra note 6, at 30.
32. Both the EMIT and RIA tests have cut-off levels below which they are unable to
detect the presence of drugs. See Hanson, supra note 31, at 9.
33. These tests include thin layer chromatography, gas chromatography, high-perform-
ance liquid chromatography, and gas chromatography/mass spectrometry. The latter test,
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the less sensitive screening test. Manufacturers of the tests, experts,
and the courts seem to be in agreement that positive screen tests
must be confirmed by an alternate testing method if an employer
plans to rely on the test results.34
It is important to understand that the tests only indicate
whether certain chemical agents are present in the urine sample.
They do not show whether the individual is using or is under the
influence of drugs at the time of testing; that is, they can not indi-
cate present impairment.3 5 Because urine is a waste product, chemi-
cals found in it may or may not still be in the bloodstream where
they can affect human performance. 0 Depending on the frequency
and intensity of drug use by the individual, the telltale chemical
agents may remain in one's urine for periods ranging from hours to
months.3a
A major concern with urinalysis drug testing is its accuracy."
Most of the problems fall into two categories: "false negatives" and
"false positives." A false negative occurs when the test incorrectly
fails to detect chemicals present in the specimen. This can be caused
by poor testing procedures 9 or alteration of the sample.'0 A false
which breaks down the urine sample into individual ions, is considered the most precise. Han-
son, supra note 31, at 10; Sims, supra note 30, at D-21, col. 3. Confirmatory tests typically
cost $60 to $70 each, Sims, supra note 30, at D-21, col. 2, while the most expensive tests may
cost upwards of $100 each. Hearings, supra note 18, at 75 (July 23, 1986, 10:00 a.m.).
34. See, e.g., ALCOHOL & DRUGS, supra note 6, at 30; Hanson, supra note 31, at 9-10;
see also Banks v. Federal Aviation Admin., 687 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1982); Capua v. City of
Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1521 (D. N.J. 1986); Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500,
1505-07 (D. D.C. 1986).
35. See Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1505 n.2 (D. D.C. 1986); Hearings,
supra note 18, at 12, 16, 33 (July 23, 1986, 1:30 p.m.); ALCOHOL & DRUGS, supra note 6, at
29.
36. ALCOHOL & DRUGS, supra note 6, at 29.
37. It is reported to have taken one drug user seventy-seven days to test "negative" after
discontinuing drug use. Hearings, supra note 18, at 84 (July 23, 1986, 10:00 a.m.).
38. See, e.g., Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1521 (D. N.J. 1986) (cit-
ing Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1505-06 (D. D.C. 1986) and authorities cited
therein); Hansen, Caudill & Boone, Crisis in Drug Testing; Results of CDC Blind Study, 253
J. A.M.A. 2382 (Apr. 26, 1985) [hereinafter CDC Blind Study]; Rothstein, Screening Work-
ers for Drugs: A Legal and Ethical Framework, II EMPL. REL. L.J. 422, 426-27 (1985-86);
America on Drugs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 28, 1986, at 51.
39. See generally CDC Blind Study, supra note 38. This widely publicized study evalu-
ated the performance of thirteen laboratories by submitting controlled urine samples through
the treatment facilities as patient samples. False negative error rates ranged from 0% to 100%,
and false positive error rates ranged from 0% to 66%. Id. at 2382. The study's conclusion is
summarized as follows:
These blind tests indicate that (1) greater care is taken with known evalua-
tion samples than with routine samples, (2) laboratories are often unable to de-
tect drugs at concentrations called for by their contracts, and (3) the observed
underreporting of drugs may threaten the treatment process. Drug treatment
facilities should monitor the performance of their contract laboratories with
quality-control samples, preferably through blind testing [i.e., submitting con-
1020
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positive occurs when testing incorrectly indicates that a specimen
contains chemicals from an illegal drug. Cross-reactivity 41 and poor
testing procedures4 are common causes of false positives.
Two other items that affect testing accuracy should be noted.
Chain-of-custody procedures are necessary to insure that samples are
not confused and that results attributable to a particular person are
in fact based on that person's urine sample.'3 Additionally, the qual-
ity of the testing laboratories is crucial to accurate testing. While
some states"' have quality assessment programs, most do not, result-
ing in varying degrees of proficiency among testing facilities.'5
III. Drug Testing of Public Employees - Evolving Case Law
A. Introduction
An examination of federal drug testing cases' 6 provides useful
trolled samples as patient samples].
Id.
40. A half teaspoon of salt added to a sample will result in a negative reading by some
tests. America on Drugs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 28, 1986, at 51. The- magazine
HIGH TIMES is reported to have recommended that an individual wishing to avoid detection
should add ammonia to the sample. Hearings, supra note 18, at 33 (July 23, 1986, 10:00 a.m.)
(testimony of Dr. Forman); see also Freedberg, supra note 14. Freedberg tells of sales of clean
urine to drug users, a ten dollar "how-to-survive-a-urine-test" kit called "U-R-IN-SAFE," and
a three-minute recorded message available in California telling how to alter urine samples to
hide evidence of drug use.
41. This phenomenon occurs when substances other than illegal drugs trigger a positive
test result. Substances that may cause such a reaction include the painkiller Ibuprofen, poppy
seeds, some herbal teas, and various over-the-counter drugs. ALCOHOL & DRUGS, supra note
6, at 29-30; Hanson, supra note 31, at II. The use of confirmatory tests may reduce the errors
resulting from cross-reactivity. Hanson, supra note 31, at 11.
42. See supra note 39.
43. See, e.g., Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089, 1095 (D. N.J. 1985), affd, 795
F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986); Hearings. supra note 18, at 28 (July 23, 1986, 1:30 p.m.).
44. States with assessment programs include California, New Jersey, New York, and
Pennsylvania. Hanson, supra note 31, at 12. In Pennsylvania, any facility testing material
originating from the human body is a "clinical laboratory" subject to the regulations set forth
in 28 PA. CODE §§ 5.1-.104 (1986) pursuant to the Clinical Laboratory Act, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 35, §§ 2151-2165 (Purdon 1977). The regulations set forth standards relating to, inter alia,
the following: minimum qualifications for laboratory personnel, 28 PA. CODE §§ 5.21-.24; oper-
ating procedures, id. §§ 5.41-.50; maintenance of records, id. §§ 5.51-.53; and quality control
and proficiency testing, id. §§ 5.61-.62.
45. See ALCOHOL & DRUGS, supra note 6, at 30-31; Hanson, supra note 31, at 12.
46. See Banks v. Federal Aviation Admin,, 687 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1982) (discussed infra
notes 69-75 and accompanying text); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D. N.J.
1986) (discussed infra notes 148-71 and accompanying text); Everett v. Napper, 632 F. Supp.
1481 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (discussed infra note 171); Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.
D.C. 1986) (discussed infra notes 127-47 and accompanying text); Shoemaker v. Handel, 619
F. Supp. 1089 (D. N.J. 1985), aff'd, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986) (discussed infra notes 111-
26 and accompanying text); McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985) (dis-
cussed infra notes 95-110 and accompanying text); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp.
482 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (discussed infra notes 76-94 and accompanying text); Division 241
Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 405 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Ill. 1975), aji'd, 538 F.2d 1264
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guidance for gaining an understanding of this rapidly developing
area of law. Because the constitutionality of urinalysis drug testing
of public employees usually hinges on fourth amendment"7 consider-
ations, a brief review of the main tenets of fourth amendment law is
helpful. As mentioned earlier, the fourth amendment's proscriptions
apply only to government activities."' Thus, the amendment simply
does not apply to searches conducted by a private employer. Under
the fourth amendment, a search occurs when there is a governmental
intrusion into an area in which an individual has a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy.49 Generally, a search is only reasonable if under-
taken pursuant to a judicially approved warrant issued upon proba-
ble cause as to the specific item to be searched or seized.5" If a
warrant is not obtained or probable cause is lacking, a search or
seizure will only be reasonable if it falls within one of the recognized
exceptions to the warrant requirement. 5' Two recognized exceptions
pertinent to urinalysis testing in the workplace are a search author-
ized by consent 52 and an administrative search in a closely regulated
industry. s A third, less well-established exception may permit
(7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976) (discussed infra notes 55-68 and accompa-
nying text). Employee drug testing cases have also arisen in state courts. See Turner v. Frater-
nal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. 1985) (regulation providing for urinalysis drug
testing of police officers based upon reasonable suspicion was not facially unconstitutional);
City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So.2d 1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (random urinalysis
testing of police officers and fire fighters held violative of the fourth amendment); Patchogue-
Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Education, 119 A.D.2d 35, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888
(1986) (compulsory urinalysis testing without reasonable suspicion as to drug use by individual
public school teachers violates fourth amendment); King v. McMickens, 120 A.D.2d 351, 501
N.Y.S.2d 679 (1986) (compelling corrections officer suspected of drug activities to submit to
urinalysis drug testing did not violate the fourth amendment). For discussion and citation of
labor arbitration cases involving drug testing, see Bensinger, supra note 14; ALCOHOL &
DRUGS, supra note 6, at 68-72.
47. See supra note 16 for text of the fourth amendment.
48. See, e.g., Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980) (private search did not vio-
late the fourth amendment); Commonwealth v. Dingfelt, 227 Pa. Super. 380, 323 A.2d 145
(1974) (constitutional limitations on searches do not extend to private citizens). See generally
Note, Private Searches and Seizures: An Application of the Public Function Theory, 48 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 433 (1980); Note, United States v. Jacobsen: Expanded Private Search Doc-
trine Undermining Fourth Amendment Values, 16 Loy. U.L.J. 359 (1985) [hereinafter Note,
United States v. Jacobsen].
49. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I, 7 (1977); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
51. For a list of commonly recognized exceptions, with citations, see Note, United States
v. Jacobsen, supra note 48, at 364.
52, See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Davis v. United States,
328 U.S. 582 (1946). For a discussion of consent in a drug testing case, see McDonell v.
Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1131 (S.D. Iowa 1985).
53. See, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (coal mines); United States v.
Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (gun selling); Colonade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397
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searches of government employees by the government in its role as
employer."
B. Federal Case Law
The first federal case to address urinalysis testing was Division
241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy."I In Suscy, a municipal
bus driver's union brought suit against a transit authority, attacking
the constitutionality 5" of work rules that provided for urine testing of
employees under certain circumstances.5 7 In defense of the rules, the
transit authority argued that the state had a substantial interest in
detecting and eliminating employees who were under the influence of
alcohol or drugs.5
In determining whether the work rules violated the fourth
amendment, the court sought to balance the interests of the public
against the interests of the individual.59 At the outset, the court
noted that a governmental agency clearly has the power to place rea-
sonable conditions on public employment." In upholding the rules,"
the court found that the transit authority had a "paramount" inter-
est in protecting the public by insuring the fitness of bus and train
operators.62 In light of this superior interest, the court concluded
that the operators could have no reasonable expectation of privacy
U.S. 72 (1970) (liquor industry). In the context of drug testing, this exception was utilized in
Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089 (D. N.J. 1985), affd, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986)
(horse racing industry).
54. See Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1515-16 (D. N.J. 1986); Allen
v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 489-91 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
55. 405 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. III. 1975), aff'd, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1029 (1976).
56. The employees alleged that the rules violated the due process protections of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments and the fourth amendment protection against unreasonable
searches. Suscy, 405 F. Supp. at 75 I. The court of appeals summarily dismissed the due pro-
cess claims. Suscy, 538 F.2d at 1266 n.2.
57. The rules expressly forbid use or possession of alcohol or narcotics by employees
while on duty, reporting for duty under the influence, and use of illegal drugs at any time.
Pursuant to the rules, employees directly involved in a serious accident or suspected to be
under the influence of alcohol or narcotics while on duty might be required to submit to urine
testing, blood testing, and in the case of an accident, a physical examination. Suscy, 538 F.2d
at 1266.
58. Suscy, 405 F. Supp. at 751.
59. Suscy, 538 F.2d at 1267 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
561 (1976); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967)).
60. Suscy, 538 F.2d at 1267 (citing Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976); Pickering
v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968)).
61. As a matter of procedure, the only question before the court was the facial validity
of the work rules; thus, the court expressed no opinion as to the application of the specific
provisions. Suscy, 538 F.2d at 1266-67.
62. Id. at 1267.
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with regard to the blood and urine tests."s
Although the court dismissed the privacy interests of the work-
ers without any discussion, it did note that the circumstances under
which testing was employed and the manner of testing were wholly
reasonable. 4 First, only those employees directly involved in a seri-
ous accident or suspected of being under the influence of alcohol or
narcotics might be required to submit to testing. 5 Second, testing
was performed only with the approval of two supervisory employ-
ees.6 6 Finally, the tests were performed in a hospital. 7 As to the
requirements of probable cause and a warrant, the court concluded
that probable cause existed because of the valid public interest in-
volved, and that due to the nature of the search, no warrant was
necessary.68
Another constitutional challenge to urinalysis in the workplace
arose in Banks v. Federal Aviation Administration.9 In Banks, two
air traffic controllers were discharged on the basis of voluntarily pro-
vided70 urine samples that tested positive for drug usage. The con-
trollers claimed a denial of due process because they were unable to
independently inspect and test the urine samples. This occurred be-
cause the FAA had allowed the testing laboratory to dispose of the
samples.
The court concluded that due process required an opportunity
for independent examination of the samples if the agency intended to
rely upon them.72 Because the controllers were denied the opportu-
nity to examine the samples, the court held that the test results were
inadmissible and that, therefore, the dismissals were improper.73
While reaching the conclusion that dismissal was improper
under the circumstances, the court noted that the agency need not
63. Id. at 1267 (citing United States v. Cogwell, 486 F.2d 823, 835 (7th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959 (1974)).
64. Suscy, 538 F.2d at 1267 (citing Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973); Wy-
man v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318 (1971); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966)).




69. 687 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1982).
70. Because the controllers voluntarily consented to the urine testing, they waived any
fourth amendment claim that they might have had otherwise. See supra note 52 and accompa-
nying text.
71. Banks, 687 F.2d at 93.
72. There was no other evidence on the record indicating drug use by the controllers. Id.
Thus, the accuracy of the tests, including the possibility that the tests were mixed up or inac-
curately performed, was the likely determinant of the entire case against the controllers. Id. at
94.
73. Id. at 96.
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ignore the tests as furnishing a basis of suspicion. 4 Thus, the agency
was free to institute a reasonable drug testing program to insure that
the employees in question were and continued to remain drug free. 5
Allen v. City of Marietta was the first of several urinalysis drug
testing cases decided in 1985.6 In Allen, the plaintiffs were munici-
pal employees who worked around high voltage electric lines.7 After
receiving reports of drug usage among employees, supervisory per-
sonnel commenced an investigation that included the use of an un-
dercover informant posing as an employee.78 Based on information
supplied by the informant and others, management notified sixteen
employees that they would be fired unless they chose to take a
urinalysis test.7' The plaintiffs in this action elected to take a urinal-
ysis test; each tested positive for marijuana and was subsequently
fired. 80 Plaintiffs then filed suit claiming violations of the fourth and
fourteenth amendments. 81
In analyzing the fourth amendment issue, the court first ex-
amined whether a urinalysis test constituted a search and seizure.
While expressing reservations as to whether a urinalysis test was the
kind of "search" contemplated by the framers of the fourth amend-
ment, the court noted that the fourth amendment had previously
been held to apply to the extraction of a blood sample,82 to
breathalyzer testing, 83 and in at least two cases, to urinalysis test-
ing.8' On this basis, the court concluded that a urinalysis test was a
search and seizure.
85
The court then assessed the reasonableness of the search. Be-
cause the test was conducted without a warrant, 86 the court sought
to determine whether it came within any of the established excep-
tions to the warrant requirement. Reviewing numerous cases,87 the
74. Id. at 97.
75. The court cautioned that if instituted, such a program should attempt to protect the
privacy of the individuals involved. Id.
76. 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985).




81. Allen, 601 F. Supp. at 485.
82. Id. at 488 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)).
83. Allen, 601 F. Supp. at 488 (citations omitted).
84. Id. at 489 (citing Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 405 F. Supp.
750 (N.D. III. 1975), aft'd, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976);
Ewing v. State, 160 Ind. App. 138, 310 N.E.2d 571 (1974)).
85. Allen, 601 F. Supp. at 489.
86. Id.
87. For a discussion of cases involving warrantless searches of government employees,
see Allen, 601 F. Supp. at 489-91.
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court concluded that an exception "which appears to have emerged"
involves searches of government employees. 8 This exception allows
warrantless searches when the government, acting as employer and
not as a law enforcer or a criminal investigator, conducts a search to
investigate employee misconduct relevant to the performance of the
employee's duty.89 Thus, while government employees have a right to
be free from warrantless searches, the government has what the
court termed "the same right as any private employer" to oversee
employees and investigate potential misconduct.90 Consequently, the
court found that the city had a right to make warrantless searches to
uncover employee misconduct and that the urine tests were not
unreasonable.91
Disposing of the workers' due process claims, the court con-
cluded that the city had afforded the workers a fair opportunity to
challenge evidence of their drug use and to appeal their dismissals.92
In addition, the court found it significant that the workers were not
terminated for exercising protected rights, but rather for using drugs
on the job in violation of city policy.9" The court stated that the
city's conclusion that the safety of the community was threatened
was entirely reasonable in light of such drug use. 94
The next case in the area of public employee urinalysis was Mc-
Donell v. Hunter.9 McDonell was a class action suit challenging the
constitutionality of policies that subjected employees of the Iowa De-
partment of Corrections to a variety of searches,' including urinal-
ysis tests. The prison employees claimed that the policies violated the
fourth amendment and their constitutional right to privacy.'
7
The court flatly rejected the argument made by the Department
of Corrections that fourth amendment protection is limited to those
88. Id. at 489.
89. Id. at 489-91.
90. Id. at 491.
91. Allen, 601 F. Supp. at 491. In upholding the testing, the court made clear that the
city had administered the tests in a "purely employment context." It is unlikely that the court
would have upheld the warrantless searches if they were for criminal investigatory purposes.
Id.
92. Id. at 492-94.
93. Id. at 495.
94. Id.
95. 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985).
96. The Iowa Department of Corrections' policy provided for the search of any employee
or vehicle entering the grounds of a correctional facility. McDonell, 612 F. Supp. at 1133. In
addition to urinalysis testing, employees were subject to blood tests, breathalyzer tests and
strip searches. Id. at 1125. Employees were requested to sign a form consenting to such
searches upon commencement of employment. Id. at 1126.
97. Id. at 1125.
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who are the subject of criminal investigation. 8 Although urine test-
ing does not involve governmental intrusion into the body," the court
noted that urine is discharged and disposed of in private. Under such
circumstances, one does not contemplate others seizing and analyz-
ing the urine. 100 Because individuals "clearly" have a reasonable and
legitimate expectation of privacy in the personal information01 con-
tained in their body fluids, the court concluded that the governmen-
tal taking of a urine sample is a seizure for fourth amendment
purposes.10°
The court next examined the reasonableness of the intrusions
permitted by the department policies. While acknowledging that
searches are "reasonably necessary" in an institution where security
is a paramount consideration, the court cautioned that such searches
must be guided by appropriate standards0 3 and not be unreasonably
intrusive.10
In support of the blood and urine testing of employees, the de-
partment also argued that such intrusions were reasonable proce-
dures designed to identify drug users and, in particular, individuals
who might be smuggling drugs into the prison.105 The court rejected
these arguments, concluding that the mere potential for uncovering
persons who might be using drugs did not make the searches reason-
able.10 To be reasonable, the court concluded, a demand for a urine,
blood, or breath sample must be made only on the basis of a reason-
able suspicion that the employee is "then under the influence of alco-
holic beverages or controlled substances."10 " Reasonable suspicion,
98. Id. at 1127 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967)). The
court in Allen v. Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985), similarly concluded that a non-
criminal search by the government of its employees may excuse the warrant requirement, but
the search must still meet fourth amendment standards of reasonableness. See supra notes 89-
91 and accompanying text.
99. McDonell, 612 F. Supp. at 1127; cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)
(administration of a blood test).
100. McDonell, 612 F. Supp. at 1127. An obvious exception is providing a urine sample
as part of a medical examination.
101. The court noted that both blood and urine can be analyzed in a medical laboratory,
disclosing "numerous physiological facts about the person from whom it came, including but
hardly limited to recent ingestion of alcohol or drugs." Id. at 1127.
102. Id.
103. According to the court, such standards would typically identify who has the author-
ity to require an employee to submit to a search or provide a sample and specify procedures for
implementing the policy. A "fundamental problem" with the instant policy was that it lacked
any written standards whatsoever. McDonell, 612 F. Supp. at 1126, 1128 n.4.
104. Id. at 1129 (citing Hunter v. Auger, 672 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1982); McMorris v.
Alioto, 567 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1978)).
105. McDonell, 612 F. Supp. at 1130.
106. Id.
107. Id. The court noted that the fourth amendment does not preclude taking a body
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the court continued, comes from "specific objective facts and reason-
able inferences drawn from those facts in light of experience. 1 Be-
cause the demand that McDonell undergo urinalysis had not been
based on reasonable suspicion, 109 the court held that it was a demand
not permissible under the fourth amendment." 0
The first urinalysis case arising in the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals was Shoemaker v. Handel."' In Shoemaker, five jockeys
brought suit challenging the constitutionality of New Jersey Racing
Commission regulations" 2 that permitted breathalyzer and urine
testing of individuals in the horse racing industry." 3 In support of
the regulations, the Commission contended that warrantless searches
of voluntary participants in a highly regulated industry were
reasonable."
4
To fall within the "administrative search"" 6 exception to the
fourth amendment, the court concluded that testing of employees in
a highly regulated industry must meet two requirements. First, there
fluid specimen as part of a pre-employment physical examination, a routine periodic physical
examination, or "on a periodic basis as a condition of continued employment under a discipli-
nary disposition if such a condition is reasonably related to the underlying basis for the disci-
plinary action and the duration is specified and is reasonable in length." Id. at 1130 n.6.
108. McDonell, 612 F. Supp. at 1130.
109. Id. at 1131. The demand that McDonell undergo urinalysis was based on confiden-
tial information received by supervisory personnel that he had been seen with individuals who
were "being looked at" by law enforcement officials investigating drug activity. McDonell re-
fused to provide a sample, was terminated, and shortly thereafter was reinstated. Id. at 1126.
The fact that McDonell had signed a consent form, see supra note 96, was held to be of little
importance, the court found that such advance consent could only apply to future reasonable
searches. Id. at 1131.
110. Id. at 1131. The court also set down minimum standards for the other types of
searches challenged in the suit. See id. at 1130, 1132.
III. 619 F. Supp. 1089 (D. N.J. 1985), affid, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
112. The regulations provided that officials, jockeys, trainers, and grooms be subjected
to breathalyzer and urine tests at the direction of the State Steward. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at
1137. As implemented by the Commission, each jockey was required to take the breathalyzer
test daily, while three to five jockeys took the urine test on a daily basis. Those required to give
urine samples were randomly selected by drawing names from an envelope. Id. at 1139-40.
Because the State Steward followed directives of the Commission and had no discretion as to
who would be tested, the court held that the lottery method of selection did not violate the
fourth amendment. Id. at 1143 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 564-
66 (1976)). But see Security and Law Enforcement Employees, Dist. Council 82 v. Carey, 737
F.2d 187, 209-10 (2d Cir. 1984). In Carey, the Second Circuit held that random strip and
cavity searches of prison employees violated the fourth amendment. The Third Circuit Court
of Appeals expressly declined to follow Carey in this regard, noting that the choice of targets
there was not made by lot. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1143 n.7.
113. The purpose of the regulations, as stated by the Deputy Director of the Racing
Commission, was "(I) to promote the Commission's primary goal of increasing the safety of
participants in the race; (2) to promote the integrity and public perception of the cleanliness of
the industry; and (3) to rehabilitate those who are found to abuse alcohol and drugs." Shoe-
maker, 619 F. Supp. at 1093.
114. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1141.
115. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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must be a strong interest in making a warrantless search." 6 Second,
the heavy regulation of the industry must have reduced the privacy
expectations of its participants."'
Because the racing industry had been prone to criminal influ-
ence," 8 the court found that the state had a strong interest in main-
taining the public confidence necessary for the industry's success." 9
Drug and alcohol testing was an effective means of insuring public
confidence and thus the continued success of the industry. 120 With
regard to the second requirement, the court noted that the Racing
Commission had traditionally regulated the industry in ways reduc-
ing the privacy expectations of its employees. 2' On this basis, the
court held that the warrantless testing by the Racing Commission
came within the administrative search exception to the fourth
amendment. 22 The holding in Shoemaker rests strongly on the regu-
lated industry aspect of the case.' 23 It is doubtful, however, that the
court would have given its approval to the testing program were it
not for the existence of detailed guidelines governing the handling of
samples, 2  accuracy of the testing, 125 and the confidentiality of test
results. 26
116. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142 (citing Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600
(1981)).
117. Id.
118. Shoemaker, 619 F. Supp. at 1099 (citations omitted).
119. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1141-42.
120. Id. at 1142.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. The court noted that its holding applied only to voluntary participants in a highly
regulated industry, and thus was not dispositive of the issues involved in testing school children
or motor vehicle drivers. Id. at 1142 n.5.
124. The testing program was announced prior to its inception. Id. at 1142. Apparently
the actual giving of a urine sample was not directly observed. Id. at 1140. Strict chain-of-
custody procedures were maintained and anonymity of the specimens was strictly preserved.
id.
125. The following procedures were used in the testing program to guard against false
positives:
First, any positive test is checked against the certification form for valid
drug use, pursuant to a prescription from a physician. Second, only a significant
drug presence will generate a positive reading. Third, the state is using special
procedures to guard against misinterpretation of positives for marijuana use,
given that metabolites signifying such use may remain in the urine for weeks.
Fourth, a jockey can request a hearing to fight the tests, test results, and the
imposition of any penalties he believes wrongfully administered under the
regulations.
Shoemaker, 619 F. Supp. at 1104.
126. Under the guidelines, tests results were strictly confidential and would not be sup-
plied to law enforcement agencies. Id. at 1095. While the penalties for violations included
fines, revocation or suspension of license, and expulsion from racing in New Jersey, id. at
1094. provision was made for the individual to enter a drug treatment program. Id. at 1095.
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Constitutional challenges of urinalysis drug testing of employees
continued during 1986. In Jones v. McKenzie,127 a school bus attend-
ant 128 brought suit challenging her discharge on the basis of a single
unconfirmed urinalysis drug test.1 29 The urinalysis test was part of a
testing program'"0 instituted by the Transportation Division of the
District of Columbia School System, and it was given during a re-
quired annual physical examination.' 1 Prior to commencement of
the testing program, the Division had no indication that Jones had
used drugs or was under the influence of drugs, either on or off
duty.13
2
The court first examined the employee's claim that the firing
had been arbitrary and capricious.13 3 The Transportation Division
failed to confirm the urine tests result by an alternate testing
method, despite a recommendation to do so by the manufacturer',
of the test and a school district directive which stated that a con-
firmed positive test was the approved basis for discharging an em-
ployee for drug abuse. 3 5 Based on documents submitted to the
court, 136 and on decisions in several other jurisdictions 3 7 citing the
need for confirmatory testing, the court concluded that termination
based on a single unconfirmed EMIT test was arbitrary and capri-
cious, 13 8 and thus in violation of both Board of Education regulations
and District of Columbia law.
3 9
127. 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D. D.C. 1986).
128. As an attendant, Jones' duties were to assist students, particularly handicapped
students, as they got on and off school buses and to observe and assist them en route to and
from school. Id. at 1503.
129. Id. The test administered was the EMIT test. See infra note 31 for a discussion of
this test. When informed of the positive test result, Jones immediately and voluntarily under-
went two additional urinalysis tests for the presence of narcotics, both of which were negative.
Id.
130. The Transportation Division instituted the testing program, which required over
200 Division employees to undergo urinalysis testing, because of a significant increase in traffic
accidents and absenteeism, and the discovery of drug paraphernalia in restrooms frequented by
Division employees. Id. at 1502.
131. Id. at 1503.
132. Id.
133. Jones, 628 F. Supp. at 1505-07.
134. The EMIT test bore a label from the manufacturer warning that -'[a n y positive
[result] should be confirmed by an alternative method.' " Id. at 1503 (citation omitted).
135. Id. at 1505.
136. See id. at 1506 (citing reports and scientific studies produced during discovery).
137. Id. (citing Anable v. Ford, No. 84-6033 (E.D. Ark. July 12, 1985); Higgs v. Wil-
son, No. 83-0256P(J) (N.D. Ky. Feb. 22, 1985); Johnson v. Walton, No. S61-84R (Vt. Super.
Feb. 14, 1984)).
138. In dicta, the court noted that literature submitted in the case suggested that before
dismissal of an employee due to a positive urine test, procedures must exist to determine that
the particular employee is in fact the subject of the particular positive test and that the posi-
tive test has been appropriately confirmed. Jones, 628 F. Supp. at 1507. See supra note 31.
139. Id. at 1506.
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The court turned next to the employee's claim that subjecting
her to urinalysis without probable cause was an unreasonable search
in violation of the fourth amendment. 40 While admitting that it had
no particular suspicion of drug abuse by Jones,14 the Transportation
Division claimed that there was no feasible way to identify drug
users except by testing all employees. 4 The Division further at-
tempted to justify its action in light of indications of drug usage
among the employees in the workplace ' 3 and the obvious public
danger that would exist if personnel assisting in the operation of
school buses were under the influence of drugs."'
Citing previous case law, the court concluded that taking a per-
son's urine and testing it for drugs was a search and seizure within
the fourth amendment." 5 In the court's view, the ultimate question
was whether a school bus attendant's expectation of privacy in body
fluids was outweighed by public safety considerations." While ac-
knowledging the strength of the safety interest, the court was not
convinced that a school bus attendant should reasonably expect to be
subjected to urine testing, or that public safety considerations were
so great as to require such testing, in the absence of "particularized
probable cause."""
140. Id. at 1507.
141. Id. at 1503.
142. The Division claimed that efforts to identify drug users by more conventional police
methods, namely, the use of undercover officers in the workplace, had been unsuccessful. Id. at
1508.
143. See supra note 130.
144. Jones, 628 F. Supp. at 1507. That the Division conducted the testing as part of an
annual physical examination required of employees was of little importance to the court; the
court focused instead on the fact that the testing program was instituted specifically to detect
drug users. See supra note 130. But cf. McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1130 n.6
(S.D. Iowa 1985) (fourth amendment does not preclude taking a body fluid specimen as part
of a routine periodic physical examination).
145. Jones, 628 F. Supp. at 1508 (citing Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482
(N.D. Ga. 1985); Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976); Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005
(D.C. 1985)).
146. Jones, 628 F. Supp. at 1507.
147. Id. at 1509. The court noted that school bus drivers or mechanics directly responsi-
ble for the operation and maintenance of buses might reasonably expect to be subject to urine
testing without particularized suspicion. Accord Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v.
Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1267 (7th Cir. 1976) (bus and train operators can have no reasonable
expectation of privacy with regard to submitting to blood and urine tests). A significant factor
in the court's reasoning was that the en masse mandatory testing imposed on the bus attend-
ants was equivalent to that imposed by the military, Committee for G.I. Rights v. Callaway,
518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975), and more stringent than that permitted for police officers,
Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. 1985), or bus drivers, Division 241
Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029
(1976).
Additionally, the court noted that no warrant had been obtained for the searches in the
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One of the most recent cases involving urine testing of public
employees was Capua v. City of Plainfield.14 8 Employees of the
Plainfield, New Jersey, Fire Department were required to submit to
unannounced urine testing, 49 and sixteen fire fighters who tested
positive for drug use were immediately terminated. 50 The sixteen
individuals brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the urine
testing and seeking to enjoin further arbitrary department-wide
testing. 5'
Relying in large part on the analysis in McDonell v. Hunter,'52
the court concluded that the governmental taking of a urine sample
was a search and seizure. 5 ' Whether such a search is "reasonable"
under the fourth amendment, the court explained, is determined by
balancing the state's interest in conducting the searches against the
individual's privacy interest. 54 The mass urine testing program of
the Fire Department, which required individuals to submit samples
under the surveillance of an agent employed by the city, 55 subjected
the fire fighters to what the court termed "a relatively high degree of
bodily intrusion."' 5 6 Compulsory urinalysis forced individuals to di-
vulge private medical information 57 that was "unrelated" to the
instant case. Jones, 628 F. Supp. at 1507. Beyond this notation, however, the court gave no
indication whether a warrant is required or whether one of the warrant exceptions applies to
such searches.
148. 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D. N.J. 1986).
149. The testing program began early one morning when supervisory employees entered
the city fire station, locked the doors, awoke the fire fighters on the premises, and required
them to submit urine samples under surveillance. Prior to that time, Fire Department person-
nel had no notice, either by collective bargaining agreement or Department regulation, of the
city's intent to conduct mass urinalysis testing. Id. at 1511.
150. Id. at 1512. The terminated employees received written complaints charging them
with violations including "commission of a criminal act." Id. Because the fire fighters might be
subjected to criminal charges, the court concluded that the city had to meet a much higher
burden of reasonableness in conducting the search than that required by the Third Circuit in
Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986). Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1520.
151. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1512.
152. 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985). See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying
text.
153. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1513 (citing also Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp.
482, 488-89 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); City
of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So.2d 1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)).
154. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1513.
155. Id. at 1511. This was the one of several factors noted by the court that distin-
guished Capua from Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089 (D. N.J. 1985), affid, 795 F.2d
1136 (3d Cir. 1986). Other factors cited by the court that distinguished Capua included the
following: the lack of procedures and standards for the testing program, see Capua, 643 F.
Supp. at 1514 n.2; the fact that the fire fighters are not voluntary participants in a highly
regulated industry, id. at 1518; and the fact that public perception is not crucial for successful
work performance by fire fighters, id. at 1519.
156. The court noted that surveillance of the urine collection further heightened the
intrusiveness into what is traditionally a private act. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1514.
157. According to the court, it is possible to uncover disorders such as epilepsy and
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government's interest in uncovering drug abuse. 158 Furthermore, be-
cause the employees had no prior notice of even the possibility of
urine testing, 159 the court found that they could reasonably expect to
be free from such testing in the workplace.16 1 In defense of the test-
ing program, the city claimed that its interest in insuring that fire
fighters were free from impairment caused by drug use"6" out-
weighed any privacy interests of the fire fighters.' 62 The most effi-
cient way to accomplish this, the city contended, was mass urinalysis
testing.' 3'
While acknowledging that the city's goal of having fully capa-
ble, drug-free fire fighters was commendable, the court noted that
the means chosen by the city to achieve this goal were not "reasona-
ble" within the meaning of the fourth amendment.'4 The fourth
diabetes by analyzing chemical compounds. Id. at 1515. Urinalysis reportedly can also indicate
whether an individual is being treated for a heart condition, depression, or schizophrenia, and
can also reveal whether the employee is pregnant. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION. DRUG
TESTING IN THE WORKPLACE I (undated pamphlet).
158. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1515.
159. See supra note 149.
160. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1515. Cf. Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d
Cir. 1986) (drug testing program announced prior to commencement).
161. The city had no information to suggest that any fire department employees were
using drugs. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1516. Cf. Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482
(N.D. Ga. 1985) (employees observed using drugs by undercover informant); Jones v. McKen-
zie, 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D. D.C. 1986) (significant increase in employee accidents and absen-
teeism, and discovery of drug paraphernalia on premises). Rather, it instituted drug testing
because it believed that drug abuse by the general population lead to a "'reasonable and
logical inference that some of those affected may ultimately be employed in a public-safety
capacity.'" Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1516 (quoting brief submitted on behalf of defendants).
162. The city contended that as public servants, fire fighters had little or no expectation
of privacy with respect to job-related inquiries by a municipal employer. Capua, 643 F. Supp.
at 1515.
163. Id. at 1516.
164. The court summarized its objections to the Plainfield testing program as follows:
The humiliation experienced by governmental intrusion into, and surveil-
lance of, a highly private bodily function; the compelled disclosure of personal
physiological data not properly within the government's possession, without any
confidentiality safeguards; the complete absence of notice or opportunity to re-
fute such testing; the implied presumption of guilt borne by each individual fire
fighter; the compulsion exercised upon threat of discharge - for all these rea-
sons, the government may not continue to usurp unregulated and standardless
discretion, but must instead comply with the minimal constitutional mandates.
Id. at 1518.
The City of Plainfield had also urged the court to uphold the testing program within the
"employment context searches of government employees" exception to the fourth amendment.
Id. at 1515; see also supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text. The court rejected this argu-
ment, suggesting that the searches in Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga.
1985), and Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 405 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Ill.
1975), aft'd, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976), had not been
upheld solely because of the government employer exception, but rather because they were
based on individualized suspicion and limited in scope; that is to say, they were "reasonable."
Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1516.
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amendment, the court stated, allows urine testing of employees only
"on the basis of a reasonable suspicion predicated upon specific facts
and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts in light of experi-
ence.""' Furthermore, any urinalysis testing program must include
procedural guidelines governing testing procedures and insuring con-
fidentiality.16 Because Plainfield's testing program was begun with-
out any indication that any Fire Department employee was under
the influence of drugs 67 and because it lacked any procedural safe-
guards, "8 the court held that the testing violated the fourth
amendment. 69
The court also concluded that the testing program violated the
fourteenth amendment due process rights of the fire fighters. °7 The
due process violations cited by the court included the lack of proce-
dural safeguards, the requirement that fire fighters submit to testing
under the threat of immediate dismissal, and the termination of fire
fighters without providing them an opportunity for independent eval-
uation of the urine samples and test results.1
7'
C. Summary
Federal courts consistently have viewed urinalysis drug testing
as an invasion of privacy,"7 and so have been willing to permit work-
165. This standard, described by the court as the "individualized reasonable suspicion
standard," requires "individualized suspicion, specifically directed to the person to be
searched." Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1517 (quoting Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) (cit-
ing Hunter v. Auger, 672 F.2d 668 (1982); Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v.
Suscy, 405 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. III. 1975), afl'd, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1029 (1976)); cf. Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986) (random searches
of voluntary participants in highly regulated industry comported with fourth amendment). The
court imposed this standard, rather than the more stringent "probable cause" standard, out of
deference to the state's legitimate interests. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1516.
166. The complete absence of procedural safeguards in the Plainfield testing program
was a crucial distinction between it and the testing system approved in Shoemaker v. Handel,
795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986). See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
167. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1516.
168. Id. at 1515.
169. Id. at 1520.
170. Id. at 1521.
171. Id. Cf. Everett v. Napper, 632 F. Supp. 1481 (N.D. Ga. 1986). In Everett, the
court held that the termination of a fire fighter for refusing to take a urinalysis test did not
violate fourteenth amendment due process rights. The court concluded that suspected use of
drugs by fire fighters and the threat it would pose to public safety provided sufficient rational
justification for requiring fire fighters suspected of drug activity to submit to drug testing.
172. Each of the cases decided after Banks explicitly stated this conclusion. But see
Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1009-11 (D.C. 1985) (Nebeker, J., con-
curring) (suggesting that one cannot hold a subjective expectation of privacy in urine). Al-
though the privacy concerns of the employees were quickly dismissed in Division 241 Amalga-
mated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976),
the court there nevertheless discussed the testing in terms of fourth amendment standards,
thus implicitly acknowledging that such testing involved an invasion of privacy. As was noted
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place testing by a governmental body only if it is conducted in a
reasonable manner. In determining whether a particular testing pro-
gram was reasonable, the courts generally have focused on two pri-
mary factors: (1) the basis for the employer's request for a urine
sample; and (2) whether procedural guidelines governing the testing
program were in place.
With the exception of Banks,"'3 the basis for the employer's re-
quest that an employee submit to urinalysis drug testing was argua-
bly the most important factor in each of the cases discussed above.
For example, the testing upheld in Suscy was performed only when
employees were suspected of drug use or were involved in serious
accidents,17 4 and the testing upheld in Allen was directed at individ-
uals seen using drugs on company premises.17 5 Conversely, the en
masse testing conducted without any particular suspicion in both
Jones 16 and Capua177 was held violative of the fourth amendment,
as was a demand in McDonellI ' 8 for a urine sample not based on
reasonable suspicion. The only case in which a court upheld random
drug testing was Shoemaker. 79 Shoemaker, however, involved vol-
untary participants in a highly regulated industry, a distinction
which that court readily acknowledged.' 80 Thus, the basic principle
that emerges from the cases is that the employer's request must be
based on a reasonable suspicion directed at the particular
employee.' 8'
in Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D. N.J. 1986), surveillance during collec-
tion of a urine sample heightens the intrusive nature of such a search.
173. 687 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1982). In Banks, the testing was based on individualized
suspicion; at issue was the lack of procedural guidelines. See supra notes 69-73 and accompa-
nying text.
174. Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1267 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976). See supra text accompanying note 65.
175. Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 484 (N.D. Ga. 1985). See supra text
accompanying note 78.
176. Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1507 (D. D.C. 1986). See supra note 130
and accompanying text.
177. Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D. N.J. 1986). See supra note 149
and accompanying text.
178. McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1131 (S.D. Iowa 1985).
179. Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089 (D. N.J. 1985), aJfd, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d
Cir. 1986). See supra notes 111-26 and accompanying text.
180. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142 n.5. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
181. In McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1130 n.6 (S.D. Iowa 1985), the court
opined that testing as part of a routine medical examination would be allowable without rea-
sonable suspicion. But see Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1507 (D. D.C. 1986) (dis-
cussed supra note 144).
None of the courts indicated that a warrant was required for such testing. In McDonell,
however, the court stressed that the search was conducted in an employment context, perhaps
indicating that a warrant would have been required had the search been undertaken for crimi-
nal investigation purposes. McDonell, 612 F. Supp. at 491.
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The existence of procedural guidelines was also a significant
factor in the determination of the reasonableness of a testing pro-
gram. In this regard, the courts noted the importance of such mini-
mum standards as prior notice of the start of a testing program, 182
the use of confirmatory testing, 183 and the right to challenge test re-
suits. 184 Thus, at one extreme was the testing program in Shoe-
maker, which was preceded by notice to all parties affected, adminis-
tered pursuant to extensive written regulations, and permitted
individuals to challenge test results.18 At the other extreme was the
testing in Capua, marred by what the court called "the complete
absence of procedural safeguards." '186 While none of the courts re-
quired all of the standards noted above, the lack of such standards
was a common denominator of the programs that failed to survive
judicial scrutiny.1
87
Federal courts are willing to permit workplace drug testing by a
governmental body when conducted in a reasonable manner. A pro-
gram that permits testing only on the basis of individualized, reason-
able suspicion and includes such minimum standards as confirmatory
testing and the right to challenge test results will have little difficulty
withstanding legal challenge by employees. On the other hand, ran-
dom or en masse testing, or the lack of basic procedural safeguards
generally, will probably doom any testing program. It is these
emerging standards for governmental drug testing that serve as the
foundation for legislation governing testing by private employers as
proposed in Section V.
IV. Drug Testing of Private Employees - Possible Means of Pro-
tection Against Unreasonable Drug Testing
Because the fourth amendment does not apply to actions taken
by private employers, private employees must look for some other
means of protection against unreasonable drug testing in the work-
place. Areas of the law that may offer such protection include state
182. See, e.g., Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d Cir. 1986); Capua v. City
of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1518 (D. N.J. 1986).
183. See, e.g., Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1505-07 (D. D.C. 1986).
184. See, e.g., Banks v. Federal Aviation Administration, 687 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir.
1982); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1521 (D. N.J. 1986); Allen v. City of
Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 493-94 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
185. Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
186. Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D. N.J. 1986).
187. Courts also looked upon the absence of standards protecting confidentiality with
disfavor. Compare Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D. N.J. 1986) (no confiden-
tiality safeguards in place) with Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986) (exten-
sive measures taken to insure confidentiality).
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constitutions, common law doctrines, and statutory provisions. This
section includes an examination of these areas as they exist in Penn-
sylvania, as well as a discussion of the impact of the employment-at-
will doctrine on drug testing by the private employer.
A. Rights Under the Pennsylvania Constitution
The use of state constitutions to protect individual rights is a
relatively recent phenomenon.188 In numerous instances,189 individu-
als use state constitutions to obtain a higher level of individual pro-
tection than that set forth in the federal constitution.190 In the con-
text of employee drug testing, the federal constitution only protects
individuals from unreasonable searches conducted by a governmental
employer. Thus, private employees most likely will look to state con-
stitutions for protection from unreasonable employer drug testing. 9'
The two common issues in urinalysis drug testing, the reasona-
bleness of the search and the privacy interests of the employee, are
generally recognized in the Pennsylvania Constitution. The constitu-
tion contains an explicit provision against unreasonable searches, 9 2
and a "right of privacy" is implicit in the liberty rights"9 of Pennsyl-
vania citizens.' 9 When one seeks to challenge private employer drug
testing under the Pennsylvania Constitution, however, the same bar-
rier that exists at the federal level reappears: the constitutional pro-
visions concerning searches and the right of privacy apply only to
188. See generally, Bamberger, Boosting your Case with Your State Constitution,
A.B.A. J., March I, 1986, at 49; State Constitutional Law, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 29, 1986, at
Supp. I.
189. See. e.g., Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975) (possession of marijuana in
the home was protected by state constitution).
190. The United States Constitution sets a level of protection of individual rights below
which state law may not fall. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Barring preemptive federal legis-
lation, states are free to provide a higher degree of protection for individual rights.
191. See Comment, Your Urine or Your Job: Is Private Employee Drug Urinalysis
Constitutional in California?, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1451 (1986) (contending that protection
against unreasonable drug testing by private employers would be available under the right to
privacy in the California Constitution).
192. Article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides as follows:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions
from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or
to seize any person or thing shall issue without describing them as nearly as may
be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to
by the affiant.
PA. CONST. art. I, § 8.
193. "All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and
indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of ac-
quiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happi-
ness." PA. CONST. art. I, § I.
194. See 7 PA. LEGAL ENCYCLOPEDIA § 123 (1980) and cases cited therein.
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governmental actions. 9 5 This restriction is stated explicitly in the
Pennsylvania Constitution, 196 and the Pennsylvania courts have
steadfastly abided by it.' 97 Thus, Pennsylvanians must look further
than their state constitution for protection against unreasonable drug
testing by private employers.
B. Common Law Right of Privacy
One doctrine under which a private employee might challenge
urinalysis drug testing is the tort of invasion of privacy. 98 This com-
mon law doctrine is recognized in Pennsylvania' 99 and described in
section 652B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,200 as follows:
"One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the in-
trusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person." ''
195. Article I, section 25 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides that "everything in
this article is excepted out of the general powers of government and shall forever remain invio-
late." PA. CONST. art. I, § 25.
196. Id.
197. For cases in which Pennsylvania courts have held that constitutional limitations on
searches do not apply to private searches, see Commonwealth v. Kozak, 233 Pa. Super. 348,
336 A.2d 387 (1975) (search of suitcase by airline employee); Commonwealth v. Dingfelt, 227
Pa. Super. 380, 323 A.2d 145 (1974) (search of student by assistant principal); Simpson v.
Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 69 Pa. Commw. 120, 450 A.2d
305 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 822 (1983) (search of employee's lunchbox by employer).
For cases noting a similar limitation on the right to privacy, see Fabio v. Civil Service Com-
mission of City of Philadelphia, 489 Pa. 309, 414 A.2d 82 (1980) (right to privacy encom-
passes protection from governmental interference); Simpson, 69 Pa. Commw. at 130 n.2, 450
A.2d at 310 n.2 (constitutional "right of privacy" does not protect persons from conduct of
private parties).
198. The action for invasion of privacy is actually comprised of four analytically distinct
torts. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652A (1977), identifies these as follows: (1)
intrusion upon seclusion, § 652B; (2) appropriation of name or likeness, § 652C; (3) publicity
given to private life, § 652D; and (4) publicity placing person in false light, § 652E. While this
Comment includes an examination of the applicability of the "intrusion upon seclusion" tort
on employee drug testing, other torts may also arise based on an employer's conduct after the
drug test. See. e.g., Houston Belt & Terminal Railway Co. v. Wherry, 548 S.W.2d 743 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1977) (defamation award upheld against employer who made statements accusing
an employee of drug use based on an unconfirmed drug test).
199. See, e.g., Marks v. Bell Tel. Co., 460 Pa. 73, 331 A.2d 424 (1975); Bennett v.
Norban, 396 Pa. 94, 151 A.2d 476 (1959); Chicarella v. Passant, 343 Pa. Super. 330, 494
A.2d 1109 (1985).
200. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). Courts applying Pennsylvania
law have cited with approval sections 652B-E of the Restatement in invasion of privacy mat-
ters. See, e.g., Fogel v. Forbes, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 1081 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Chicarella v. Passant,
343 Pa. Super. 330, 494 A.2d 1109 (1985); Harris by Harris v. Easton Publishing Co., 335 Pa.
Super. 141, 483 A.2d 1377 (1984); Nagy v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 292 Pa. Super. 24, 436 A.2d
701 (1981).
201. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977); see generally, W. PROSSER &
W. KEETON. THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 854-56 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER].
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Unlike other invasion of privacy torts, 2 ' the "intrusion upon se-
clusion" tort does not require publication as an element of the of-
fense;108 the intrusion itself is the tort.20 4 The tort may occur by
physical intrusion into a place where one has sought seclusion, by
use of the defendant's senses to oversee or overhear private affairs of
the plaintiff, or by some other form of investigation or examination
into the private concerns of another. 08 Liability will not attach,
however, unless the intrusion is substantial and would be highly of-
fensive to the ordinary reasonable person. 06
An examination of Pennsylvania case law reveals only a small
number of cases involving the tort of intrusion upon seclusion. The
only reported case in which the plaintiff brought a successful 0 7 ac-
tion under this tort is Vernars v. Young, 08 in which a claim was
recognized against a corporate officer who opened and read private
mail addressed to a fellow employee. 0 9
A limitation was placed on this tort as it exists in Pennsylvania
in Marks v. Bell Telephone Company. 10 In Marks, the plaintiff
challenged a police department's recording of incoming phone calls
as an intrusion upon seclusion. " ' The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
concluded that a basic element of this tort is the intentional over-
hearing by one not intended to be a party to the conversation. 12
Because the record indicated that the only "ear" that heard the
202. See supra note 198.
203. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B comment a (1977).
204. Id. at § 652B comment b.
205. Id.; Harris by Harris v. Easton Publishing Co., 335 Pa. Super. 141, 153, 483 A.2d
1377, 1383 (1984).
206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B comment d (1977); see also Chicarella
v. Passant, 343 Pa. Super. 330, 339, 494 A.2d 1109, 1114 (1985); Harris by Harris v. Easton
Publishing Co., 335 Pa. Super. 141, 154, 483 A.2d 1377, 1383-84 (1984).
207. Courts applying Pennsylvania law found no intrusion upon seclusion in the follow-
ing cases: Fogel v. Forbes, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 1081 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (unintrusive photograph
taken in a public place); Chicarella v. Passant, 343 Pa. Super. 330, 494 A.2d 1109 (1985)
(brief description of plaintiff's medical treatment obtained from hospital records was neither
substantial nor highly offensive intrusion); Harris by Harris v. Easton Publishing Co., 335 Pa.
Super. 141, 483 A.2d 1377 (1984) (information voluntarily disclosed by plaintiff previously);
Nagy v. Bell Tel. Co., 292 Pa. Super. 24, 436 A.2d 701 (1981) (obtaining a list of telephone
numbers dialed from a subscriber's phone was not a highly offensive or objectionable act).
208. 539 F.2d 966 (3d Cir. 1976).
209. Id. at 968-69. The district court had dismissed the claim, relying on Marks v. Bell
Tel. Co., 460 Pa. 73, 331 A.2d 424 (1975) and Vogel v. W.T. Grant Co., 458 Pa. 124, 327
A.2d 133 (1974). The court of appeals distinguished those cases, noting that Marks had not
involved an intrusion by any unauthorized persons and that Vogel had dealt only with the
"publicity given to private life" provision of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D.
210. 460 Pa. 73, 331 A.2d 424 (1975).
211. Id. at 85, 331 A.2d at 430.
212. Id. at 86-87, 331 A.2d at 431.
1039
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plaintiff's conversations was mechanical and not human, 1 s the court
held that the plaintiff had failed to establish existence of the tort.
14
Beyond the limitations set forth in the Restatement, the holding
in Marks is the only restriction placed upon the intrusion upon se-
clusion tort in Pennsylvania." 5 Thus, a cause of action for intrusion
upon seclusion arises when an intrusion21 6 is both substantial and
highly offensive,21 7 and involves sensory perceptions of the in-
truder.21 8 If a prima facie case is made out, the intruder may be able
to assert an affirmative defense such as consent.2 19
Several distinct aspects of urinalysis drug testing may pose pri-
vacy concerns. These include the request or demand by the employer
for a sample, surveillance during urine collection, and chemical anal-
ysis of the urine sample. By itself, an employer's request for a urine
sample is not likely to support an intrusion upon seclusion claim.
While some may consider such a request to be offensive or demean-
ing, it is doubtful that the mere request would be "highly offensive"
to an ordinary reasonable person. More importantly though, the re-
quest simply does not constitute an "intrusion" as defined in the
Restatement.220
Surveillance of urine collection presents a much closer issue.
The discharge of urine is obviously a private act; facilities both in
and out of the home recognize this privacy tradition. Surveillance of
213. Although the police department recorded all calls, it reused the tapes a short time
later, thereby erasing any previously recorded conversations. Id.
214. Id. at 87, 331 A.2d at 431. In a concurring opinion, Justice Pomeroy stated his
disagreement with the majority's "artificial restriction" of the tort so as to exclude nonhuman
intrusions. Noting that the tort is designed to protect an individual from the very act of inter-
fering with his seclusion, it was Pomeroy's conclusion that the presence of an "electronic ear"
where one normally expects to be alone was itself an actionable invasion of privacy. While
acknowledging that whether any human being heard the recorded conversation would have a
bearing on damages, he concluded that the absence of that element should not be fatal to the
cause of action. Id. at 88-91, 331 A.2d at 432-33 (Pomeroy, J., concurring). Pomeroy's argu-
ment finds support in case law and commentary outside Pennsylvania. See, e.g., Pemberton v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 65 Md. App. 133, 502 A.2d 1101 (1986) and cases cited therein;
PROSSER, supra note 201, § 117, at 854-56.
215. Kedra v. City of Philadelphia, 454 F. Supp. 652, 667 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
216. If an employee refuses to submit to urine testing, no actionable intrusion has oc-
curred. See Gretencord v. Ford Motor Co., 538 F. Supp. 331 (D. Kan. 1982) (no intrusion
upon seclusion took place when employee refused to allow employer to search his vehicle); but
cf. McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985) (demand that employee undergo
urinalysis, which was refused by employee, violated fourth amendment).
217. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B comment d (1977).
218. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). This question takes into ac-
count the holding in Marks that an intrusion by artificial means alone does not establish the
invasion of privacy tort in Pennsylvania. See Marks v. Bell Tel. Co. , 460 Pa. 73, 85-88, 331
A.2d 424, 430-31 (1975); but see id. at 88-91, 331 A.2d at 432-33 (Pomeroy, J., concurring).
219. See infra notes 227-28 and accompanying text.




the act, which some consider an essential element of urinalysis test-
ing,22 forces those tested to expose parts of their anatomy to an ob-
server "in a manner akin to a strip search." '222 Application of the
section 652B guidelines indicates that surveillance of urine collection
is clearly an intentional intrusion because it involves the use of one's
senses to oversee the private affairs of another.22 ' Whether such sur-
veillance is substantial and highly offensive is more subjective, but it
is easy to imagine how a test given under such circumstances could
be an embarrassing and humiliating experience.22' Arguably, this in-
trusion is indeed both substantial and highly offensive.
Apart from the demand for a urine sample and surveillance, an
intrusion upon seclusion may occur through chemical analysis of
one's urine. Technology has made possible the discovery of "numer-
ous physiological facts" about the person providing the sample, in-
cluding but not limited to the use of drugs. 228 Analysis of one's urine
clearly fits within the definition of an intrusion under the Restate-
ment. It is a form of investigation or examination of another's pri-
vate concerns, not unlike the discovery of information through the
opening of private mail in VernarsY 6 Such an intrusion is substan-
tial, but again, not necessarily "highly offensive." Most likely, how-
ever, absent voluntary consent, analysis of one's urine and its attend-
ant revelation of personal information would be highly offensive to
an ordinary person.
Once it is determined that the surveillance and chemical analy-
sis aspects of drug testing involve "intrusions," it is then necessary to
examine defenses that might be asserted by an employer. Two possi-
ble defenses of the employer exist. First, if the employer obtained the
voluntary consent of the employee prior to testing, the employee is
clearly without recourse.22 7 A second defense that the employer may
221. See Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1514 (D. N.J. 1986); see also
supra note 40 and accompanying text regarding alteration of the sample.
222. Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1514 (D. N.J. 1986).
223. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652B comment b (1977).
224. See, e.g., United States v. Sandier, 644 F.2d 1163, 1167 (5th Cir. 1981) (strip
search entails at the very least embarrassment to the person involved); Hearings, supra note
18, at 8 (July 23, 1986, 1:30 p.m.) (account of a woman describing giving a sample under
surveillance).
225. McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (S.D. Iowa 1985). See supra note
157.
226. 539 F.2d 966 (3d Cir. 1976). See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
227. See PROSSER, supra note 201, at 867 and cases cited therein. Voluntary consent
will distinguish many instances of urinalysis drug testing from submission of a urine sample as
part of a routine medical examination. The fact that an employee submits to a test would not
seem dispositive of the issue; arguably, the circumstances should be examined to determine
whether consent was given voluntarily. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973);
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assert, even if consent is lacking, is that the employer had a reasona-
ble need to know whether the employee is using drugs.2 8
A recent Pennsylvania case involving an employee search may
shed light on how the courts would analyze a case of intrusion result-
ing from urinalysis drug testing. In Simpson v. Commonwealth, Un-
employment Compensation Board of Review,2 29 an employer had in-
stituted the practice of conducting searches of employee lunchboxes
at the plant gate to see if employees were leaving with tools or other
property of the company.3 An employee who refused to open his
lunchbox for inspection231 brought suit challenging the employer's
search as a violation of constitutional prohibitions against unreasona-
ble searches and as an invasion of his right to privacy.23 2
In response to the employee's contentions, the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court first noted that any "right of privacy" or right
to be free from private searches must come from a person's common
law rights against private parties.233 The court then proceeded to dis-
cuss the nature of the employee-employer relationship. By volunta-
rily entering into this legal relationship, an employee owes the em-
ployer reasonable cooperation in matters important to the
McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1131 (S.D. Iowa 1985). It would seem that consent
given in the face of dismissal for refusal to take a urine test would be somewhat less than
voluntary.
228. See, e.g., Simmons v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 452 F. Supp. 392, (W.D. Okla.
1978), afijd, 611 F.2d 342 (10th Cir. 1979) (permitting recording of certain employee phone
conversations). In the context of employee drug testing, whether the employer's interest
prevails will depend on the particular factual circumstances. Compare Shoemaker v. Handel,
795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986) (state's interest in assuring public of integrity of horse racing
industry outweighed employees' privacy interests) with Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500
(D. D.C. 1986) (school bus attendant's privacy interest outweighed public safety interests of
employer). In Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1515 (D. N.J. 1986), the court
concluded that the city had no legitimate need for access to personal medical data, including
signs of epilepsy and diabetes, which might be uncovered through urinalysis testing of fire
fighters. That position may be somewhat extreme, though, as it seems that medical conditions
that might affect the performance of its fire fighters would in fact be of valid interest to the
city.
229. 69 Pa. Commw. 120, 450 A.2d 305 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 822 (1983).
230. During the periodic, random searches, every employee leaving the company prem-
ises was asked to open his or her lunchbox. The employer was searching for an allegedly stolen
drill. Id. at 124, 450 A.2d at 307.
231. As a result of the employee's refusal to submit to the lunchbox search, he was
suspended from employment for one week. During his suspension, the employee filed for unem-
ployment benefits. In the instant case, the employee was appealing an unemployment board
order denying him benefits during the period of suspension. See id. at 122-25, 450 A.2d at
306-08.
232. Id. at 124, 450 A.2d at 308.
233. Id. at 130 n.2, 450 A.2d at 310 n.2. The court noted that neither the federal consti-
tution nor the Pennsylvania Constitution provides protection from searches by private parties.
Id. at 128, 450 A.2d at 309 (citing Commonwealth v. Dingfelt, 227 Pa. Super. 380, 323 A.2d
145 (1974); PA. CoNsT. art. I, § 8).
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employer.234 The extent to which this obligation of cooperation will
prevail over an employee's common law rights "rest[s] on a conclu-
sion about the circumstantial reasonableness of the employer's re-
quest and its burdensomeness to the employee." 8 If the employer's
request is deemed reasonable, any conflicting common law rights of
the employee will have been waived by virtue of the employee's vol-
untary entrance into the legal relationship with the employer.2" On
the facts presented in Simpson, the court concluded that the em-
ployer's interest, when compared with the degree of burden to the
employees, was reasonable, and thus, the employee had failed to
show "good cause" for his refusal to cooperate. 87
Under the rationale of Simpson, a Pennsylvania court would
likely engage in a balancing of the employer's interest against the
burden imposed on the employees through testing. Indeed, the same
type of analysis has been used by courts that have already addressed
challenges to employer drug testing programs.238 Whether the em-
ployer's interest prevails will vary depending on the particular fac-
tual situation.289
The intrusion upon seclusion tort may offer some protection
from surveillance and chemical analysis of a urine sample. Several
stumbling blocks exist, however, that may prevent recognition of this
tort. These include whether a particular judge or jury would find
such an intrusion to be highly offensive,240 whether the employee
consented to the testing,241 and whether a particular judge or jury
believed that the employer's purpose outweighed the privacy inter-
ests of the employee.242 Because of these uncertainties, and the fact
that this tort cannot prevent an employer from firing an employee,
the intrusion upon seclusion tort does not provide adequate protec-
tion against unreasonable drug testing of private employees in
Pennsylvania.
234. Id. at 131, 450 A.2d at 311. The court noted that entering into a legal relationship
often results in diminution of some common law right that could otherwise be exercised with
impunity. Id.
235. Id. at 132, 450 A.2d at 311.
236. Id.
237. Simpson, 69 Pa. Commw. at 132-33, 450 A.2d at 311. On this basis, the court
upheld the Unemployment Compensation Board's denial of benefits to the employee. See supra
note 23 1.
238. See. e.g., Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, (D. N.J. 1986); Jones v.
McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, (D. D.C. 1986).
239. See supra note 228.
240. See supra notes 224-26 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 228.
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C. Rights Under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act
A statutory provision that may offer protection against em-
ployer drug testing is the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act
(PHRA).24  By this Act, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has
made it "public policy"244 to foster employment of all persons in ac-
cordance with their fullest capacities regardless of their handicaps. 24 5
The Act prohibits employers 2"4 from discriminating against job ap-
plicants or employees because of a "non-job related handicap or dis-
ability" 247 if the individual is capable of performing the services re-
quired. 48 At the outset, it is clear that the Act does not prohibit
drug testing itself, but it may govern actions that an employer might
take on the basis of such testing. Whether the PHRA affords protec-
tion against employer drug testing involves consideration of several
distinct issues.
The first issue is whether drug abuse comes within the statutory
definition of "handicap." The PHRA regulations 4 9 relating to dis-
crimination on the basis of a handicap do not specifically address
drug abuse or addiction. Drug addiction has been found, however, to
be a "handicap ' 250 under a similar federal statute, 25' and because
243. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-962.2 (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1986); see generally
Comment, Voluntary Handicaps--Should Drug Abuse, Alcoholism, and Obesity be Protected
by Pennsylvania's Anti-Discrimination Laws?, 85 DICK. L. REV. 475 (1981), (suggesting that
the arguably voluntary nature of such conditions is insufficient, standing alone, to justify exclu-
sion from the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act).
244. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 952(b) (Purdon Supp. 1986).
245. Id. Specifically, the Act is designed to prevent "discrimination against individuals
or groups by reason of their race, color, religious creed, ancestry, handicap or disability, use of
dogs because of blindness or deafness or the user, age, sex, or national origin." PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43, § 952(a) (Purdon Supp. 1986).
246. The Pennsylvania Human Relations Act covers employers with four or more em-
ployees. It also covers the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions, including school dis-
tricts. Id. § 954(b).
247. This term is defined as "any handicap or disability which does not substantially
interfere with the ability to perform the essential functions of the employment which a handi-
capped person applies for, is engaged in or has been engaged in. ... Id. § 954(p). The
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission regulations also provide that:
(ii) A handicap or disability is not job-related merely because the job may
pose a threat of harm to the employe [sic] or applicant with the handicap or
disability unless the threat is one of demonstrable and serious harm.
(iii) A handicap or disability may be job-related if placing the handicapped
or disabled employe [sic] or applicant in the job would pose a demonstrable
threat of harm to the health and safety of others.
16 PA. CODE § 44.4 (1985).
248. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(a) (Purdon Supp. 1986).
249. See 16 PA. CODE §§ 44.1-.15 (1982).
250. See Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (regulation barring former
users and drug addicts from city employment, without consideration of each individual case,
held violative of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973); 42 Fed. Reg. 22,686 (1977) (codified at 45
C.F.R. § 84, app. A(4) (1985) (drug addicts may be handicapped for purposes of 29 U.S.C. §
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the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission152 has adopted the
federal definition of "handicapped or disabled person" '258 verba-
tim,254 drug addiction would seem to be a handicap for purposes of
the PHRA.
It is clear then that an individual seeking protection under the
PHRA must qualify as an "addict." Addiction has been defined as a
"compulsive physiological need for a habit forming drug (as her-
oin)." 55 While there may be little doubt that a heroin user is a drug
addict, a much closer question is presented by the employee who
claims to be a "recreational" or "social" user of a drug that may not
cause physiological dependence. In the latter case, it is likely that
the individual would not be considered a drug "addict" and would
thus not be covered by the provisions of the PHRA.
Assuming that the employee "qualifies" as a drug addict, one
additional factor will affect the applicability of the Act to the situa-
tion. In order to be protected by the PHRA, the employee must cur-
rently be able to perform the assigned work task." 6 If a handicapped
employee is able to perform, then the employer has a statutory obli-
gation to reasonably accommodate the employee. 5
Upon examination, the impact of the PHRA on workplace drug
testing appears rather limited. It offers no protection to employees
who are not addicted to drugs,25 8 nor does it protect employees
whose drug use adversely affects their ability to perform assigned
tasks or endangers the safety of others.2 59 The only class of employ-
ees the PHRA appears to protect are those whose addiction has
neither substantially interfered with their job performance nor posed
701-794 (1976)).
251. See Federal Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C, §§ 701-794 (1976).
252. The Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission is the agency charged with en-
forcement of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-962.2
(Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1986).
253. By express provision, the term excludes
any individual who is an alcoholic or drug abuser whose current use of alco-
hol or drugs prevents such individual from performing the duties of the job in
question or whose employment, by reason of such current alcohol or drug abuse,
would constitute a direct threat to property of the safety of others.
29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982).
254. See 16 PA. CODE § 44.4 comment (1985).
255. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 13 (1977).
256. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
257. Under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission guidelines, an employer
must make reasonable accommodations for the employee's non-job related handicap unless the
making of such accommodation would impose "undue hardship." 16 PA. CODE § 44.5 (1985).
Factors to be considered in determining whether an undue hardship would result from reasona-
ble accommodation are set forth in 16 PA. CODE § 44.4.
258. See supra notes 249-54 and accompanying text.
259. This group may include both recovered addicts and current users.
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a threat of harm to their fellow employees. z6" The Act may prevent
their dismissal if it is based solely on the fact that they are addicted
to drugs. In the case of a current drug user, however, it may be very
difficult to refute an employer's allegation that the employee's drug
use has "substantially interfered""26 with job performance or endan-
gered fellow employees. 62 As a result, the protections afforded by
the PHRA are not adequate to prevent unreasonable workplace drug
testing by private employers.
D. Impact of the Employment-At-Will Doctrine
Another factor to be considered with regard to workplace drug
testing is the employment-at-will doctrine.2 63 Under this common
law doctrine, an employment relationship may be terminated by ei-
ther party at any time."" Application of this doctrine can have a
particularly harsh effect on employees, who may find themselves
without legal recourse upon discharge by an employer whether for a
good reason or no reason at all."'
260. See supra note 247.
261. See supra note 247.
262. See supra note 247.
263. The term is defined in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY as follows: "Unless
otherwise agreed, mutual promises by principal and agent to employ and to serve create obli-
gations to employ and serve which are terminable upon notice by either party; if neither party
terminates the employment, it may terminate by lapse of time or by supervening events."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 442 (1958); see generally Annotation, Modern Status
of Rule That Employer May Discharge At-Will Employee for Any Reason, 12 A.L.R.4th 544
(1982 & Supp. 1986).
Certainly the majority of private, nonunion employees with whom this comment is pri-
marily concerned fit into the employment-at-will category. It seems equally certain that most
individuals would be surprised to discover the breadth of an employer's power to terminate an
employment relationship with legal immunity, see infra note 265, a power that in Pennsylvania
likely includes the ability to dismiss an employee who refuses to take a urinalysis drug test not
based on reasonable suspicion or who "fails" a single, unconfirmed test. See infra text accom-
panying notes 276-77.
264. See Rogers v. International Business Mach. Corp., 500 F. Supp. 867, 868 (W.D.
Pa. 1980) (citing Cummings v. Kelling Nut Co., 368 Pa. 448, 84 A.2d 323 (1951)). Pennsyl-
vania law presumes an at-will employment absent a collective bargaining agreement, an indi-
vidual contract for a fixed period of time, or some statutory restriction on discharge of em-
ployee. Comment, Employment-At-Will in Pennsylvania: Employee Manuals Provide
Contract Remedies for Discharged Employees, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 243, 248 (1985).
265. See Sharon Steel Corp. v. VJR Co., 604 F. Supp. 420, 421 (W.D. Pa. 1985). For
example, empldyees' claims for wrongful discharge have failed in the following cases: Callahan
v. Scott Paper Co., 451 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (discharged for objecting to employer's
violations of antitrust law); Fleming v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 917 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
(alleged termination for disclosing embezzlement); O'Neill v. ARA Servs., Inc., 457 F. Supp.
182 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (discharged to conceal wrongful acts by employer).
The harshness of this doctrine has certainly not gone unnoticed by commentators, who
have had numerous suggestions for reform. See, e.g., Decker, At-Will Employment in Pennsyl-
vania - A Proposal for its Abolition and Statutory Regulation, 87 DICK. L. REV. 477
(1983); Decker, Reinstatement as a Remedy for a Pennsylvania Employer's Breach of a
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In response to such harsh results, various courts and legislatures
have developed certain exceptions to the doctrine.266 Exceptions have
been recognized in instances when terminations were found to: (1)
violate a clear mandate of public policy;26 (2) breach the obligation
of good faith and fair dealing26 8 implicit in every contract; or (3)
breach the employer's handbook or employment policy.2 69 The only
exception consistently recognized by Pennsylvania courts, however,
involves terminations found to violate public policy.2 70 Additionally,
this exception has been restricted to include only violations of public
policy expressed in a constitution or statute.7
Discharge of an at-will employee in connection with a urinalysis
drug testing program may present several potential bases for a chal-
lenge including: whether the test was confirmed by an alternate test-
ing method;2 72 whether chain-of-custody controls were adequate;
27
whether an employee's off-duty drug use which does not affect work
performance is a legitimate concern of the employer;2 7" and even
whether the mere request for a urine sample for drug testing, from
an employee who has exhibited no signs of drug use or diminished
performance and who does not occupy a position with safety implica-
tions, might constitute "bad faith" on the part of the employer.275
The difficulty that arises for the private employee in Pennsylva-
nia is the limited recognition that Pennsylvania courts have given to
exceptions to the at-will doctrine. As stated above, the only exception
consistently recognized in Pennsylvania involves violations of express
public policy. 276 At present, employee drug testing in Pennsylvania is
not prohibited by the state constitution or its statutory law. The only
Handbook or an Employment Policy, 90 DICK. L. REV. 41 (1985) [hereinafter Decker]; Com-
ment, Employment-At-Will in Pennsylvania: Employee Manuals Provide Contract Remedies
for Discharged Employees, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 243 (1985) [hereinafter Comment]; Note, The Role
of Federal Courts in Changing State Law: The Employment at Will Doctrine in Pennsylvania,
133 U. PA. L. REV. 227 (1984).
266. See Decker, supra note 265, at 41-42; Comment, supra note 265, at 244.
267. See Decker, supra note 265, at 42; Comment, supra note 265, at 250-252.
268. See Decker, supra note 265, at 42; Comment, supra note 265, at 250-252.
269. See Decker, supra note 265, at 48 n.35; Comment, supra note 265, at 253-66.
270. See Rogers v. International Business Mach. Corp., 500 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Pa.
1980); Rossi v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 340 Pa. Super. 39, 54-55, 489 A.2d 828, 836-37
(1985); see also, Molush v. Orkin Extermination Co., 547 F. Supp. 54 9E.D. Pa. 1982)
(wrongful discharge found when employee was dismissed for refusing to submit to polygraph
test; an employer in Pennsylvania is expressly prohibited from discharging an employee for
such refusal by 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7321(I) (Purdon 1983)).
271. Comment, supra note 265, at 251 n.60.
272. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
273. See supra text accompanying note 43.
274. See supra notes 23, 228 and accompanying text.
275. See ALCOHOL & DRUGS, supra note 6, at 76.
276. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
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public policy issue that might be involved is the state's policy of non-
discrimination against "handicapped" individuals; this category,
however, includes only a limited number of individuals and is not
likely to be a factor in most workplace drug testing situations. 2 " Be-
cause dismissal resulting from a drug testing program is not likely to
involve an express public policy, and given the general reluctance of
the Pennsylvania courts to recognize exceptions to the at-will doc-
trine, this area appears to offer little promise for protecting the pri-
vate employee in Pennsylvania from unreasonable drug testing.
V. Proposal for Legislation
As the evolving case law indicates, the fourth amendment ade-
quately protects the privacy rights of public employees and insures
that urinalysis drug testing will only take place under limited cir-
cumstances and in a reasonable manner. A small number of private
employees may gain similar protection through a union contract or
similar agreement. The majority of private employees, however, are
not union members.278
Examination of several possible means of protection for the pri-
vate employee in Pennsylvania promises little in the way of success.
Of the various options discussed above, only the common law right
of privacy offers the private employee even a scintilla of hope, and it
is speculative at best. Consequently, legislation at the state level is
necessary to provide some level of protection for private employees in
Pennsylvania. The following suggestions for such legislation re-
present an attempt to balance the legitimate needs of employers and
the privacy interests of their employees. In addition, sample legisla-
tion is located in the Appendix to this Comment.
A. Notice
Employees should be informed in writing of an employer's pol-
icy regarding substance abuse. 79 Employers should provide notice to
all employees prior to commencement of a drug testing program, 8 '
and they should also explain the reasons for implementing a testing
277. See supra notes 258-62 and accompanying text.
278. See supra note 17.
279. See P. BENSINGER, supra note 14, at 22; Hanson, supra note 31, at 13.
280. Failure to provide prior notice was cited as one of the elements of a testing pro-
gram found violative of the fourth amendment in Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp.
1507 (D. N.J. 1986). Conversely, the testing program approved in Shoemaker v. Handel, 619
F. Supp. 1089, 1093 (D. N.J. 1985), aftid, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986), was announced in
advance through notices posted at the race tracks, a mailing sent to each employee, and a
meeting of all parties on the first day of the program.
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program. Such notice gives the program a sense of fairness which is
essential for employee cooperation and acceptance of the program."'
The company policy should include discussion of the circumstances
under which testing will be required, 82 the testing methodology to
be used,2 83 and the respective rights of both the employer and the
employee under such a program. 8 The policy should explain such
items in sufficient detail so as to limit the possibility of misunder-
standing and inconsistent application of the rules. 8 Furthermore,
consistent application of disciplinary rules and procedures of the pro-
gram is crucial for the ongoing acceptance of the program by the
employees. 2 "0
B. Restrictions on Urinalysis Drug Testing
Testing should be permitted only on the basis of a reasonable
suspicion that the particular employee is under the influence of a
chemical substance. 8 Under a reasonable suspicion standard, a de-
281. See Hearings. supra note 18, at 6 (Sept. 8, 1986, 10:00 a.m.) (written statement of
the president of the Pa. AFL-CIO); id. at I (written statement of a representative of the Pa.
Chamber of Commerce); Lehr & Middlebrooks, supra note 23, at 417.
282. See infra note 287 and accompanying text.
283. See infra note 292 and accompanying text.
284. For example, it would be crucial to specify the action to be taken upon either a
positive test result or a refusal by an employee to submit to testing.
285. See infra note 286 and accompanying text.
286. See P. BENSINGER, supra note 14, at 22.
287. See, e.g., Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1267
(7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976) (discussed supra note 65 and accompany-
ing text); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1517 (D. N.J. 1986) (discussed
supra note 165 and accompanying text); McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1130 (S.D.
Iowa 1985) (discussed supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text); infra Appendix at §
3300A.5. Some principles that help to define the contours of this standard were noted in Se-
curity and Law Enforcement Employees, Dist. Council 82 v. Carey, 737 F.2d 187 (2d Cir.
1984):
Inchoate, unspecified suspicions do not meet this definition .... Further,
the suspicion must be directed to a specific person. Factors that may be taken
into account in determining reasonable suspicion [include]: (I) the nature of the
tip or information; (2) the reliability of the informant; (3) the degree of corrobo-
ration; and (4) other facts contributing to suspicion or lack thereof.
Id. at 205 (citations omitted). Although reasonable suspicion is a legal term of art, it seems to
provide those in the workplace with a description that is both practical and understandable.
Adoption of a reasonable suspicion standard necessarily precludes random testing of em-
ployees. Random testing of private employees is prohibited in San Francisco. See infra Appen-
dix at § 3300A.5. With the exception of Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089 (D. N.J.
1985), affid, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986), the federal courts have rejected random or en
masse urinalysis drug testing. See Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D. N.J.
1986); Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D. D.C. 1986). See also City of Palm Bay v.
Bauman, 475 So.2d 1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (random testing of police officers and fire
fighters found violative of the fourth amendment).
Recognizing that an absolute reasonable suspicion may not be legislatively feasible, other
alternatives are possible. For example, testing might be permitted under the following limited
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mand for a urine sample must be "based on specific objective facts
and rational inferences that may be drawn from those facts in light
of experience. ' "88 The facts and inferences should be disclosed to the
individual at the time a demand for a sample is made, and should be
reduced to writing and preserved. 8 9 Only upon the concurrence of
two supervisory employees should an employee be asked to submit to
urinalysis drug testing. 90
C. Chemical Analysis and Confirmatory Testing
Any chemical analysis of a urine sample must be performed by
a laboratory certified by the Pennsylvania Department of Health.29'
Upon request of the employee, the employer should be required to
provide for confirmatory testing29 2 of a positive sample at the em-
ployer's expense .29  Additionally, the employer must provide the em-
ployee with a reasonable opportunity to challenge or explain test
results.29'
D. Confidentiality
The testing program must insure the confidentiality of partici-
pants and test results. 9 5 Positive results in an initial screening test
circumstances: as part of a pre-employment physical examination or routine periodic physical
examination; as a condition of continuing employment when the employee has previously been
involved in drug activity in the workplace; or when the employee's position directly involves
public safety considerations. If random testing is permitted in some limited fashion, legislation
should require that prospective employees be notified prior to accepting such an assignment
that such testing is a condition of employment for the particular position. Additionally, the
other standards included in this legislative proposal should still apply regardless of the specific
suspicion standard adopted.
288. McDonell, 612 F. Supp. at 1129-30 (citing Hunter v. Auger, 672 F.2d 668, 674
(8th Cir. 1982)).
289. See id. at 1132.
290. See Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1267 (7th
Cir. 1976) (discussed supra note 66 and accompanying text).
291. See supra note 44.
292. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. It should be emphasized that confir-
matory testing must utilize a testing method different from that used in the initial test.
293. See Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1505-07 (D. D.C. 1986) (discussed
supra text accompanying notes 133-39); infra Appendix at § 3300A.5(c).
294. See Banks v. Federal Aviation Administration, 687 F.2d 92, 94-95 (5th Cir. 1982)
(discussed supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F.
Supp. 1507, 1518 (D. N.J. 1986) (discussed supra note 164); Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F.
Supp. 1089, 1104 (D. N.J. 1985), aff'd, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986) (discussed supra note
125); infra Appendix at § 3300A.5(c).
295. See Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1516 (D. N.J. 1986) (discussed
supra note 166 and accompanying text); Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089, 1095 (D.
N.J. 1985), af-d, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986) (discussed supra note 126); Hearings, supra
note 18, at 4-6 (written statements on behalf of the Pa. AFL-CIO and the Pa. Chamber of
Commerce); P. BENSINGER, supra note 14, at 22; Rothstein, supra note 38, at 429.
The testing program approved in Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (1986), main-
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should not be disclosed unless confirmatory testing has indicated the
same result." " The employer should strictly limit access to testing
information maintained by the company. 97 Unless required by law,
test results should not be supplied to law enforcement agencies. 9 8
E. Preemption
The legislation should not prohibit employers and employees
from adopting stricter procedural standards than those required by
the legislation or from altogether prohibiting drug testing in the
workplace.
F. Sanctions
While recognizing that employees may be terminated on the ba-
sis of a confirmed test result, legislation should encourage employers
to consider other choices such as rehabilitation and counseling 9'
which might prove to be equally cost-effective solutions to substance
abuse problems.300 Employers should also be encouraged to adopt
"employee assistance plans" as an effective means of addressing such
problems. s01
G. Enforcement Provisions
To be effective, legislation must include enforcement provisions
tained anonymity by attaching only an identifying number to the urine sample. Forms match-
ing the samples to particular individuals were stored in a safe and access to the information
was limited. Id. at 1140. In Pennsylvania, state regulations require that specimens received by
a clinical laboratory be numbered, with the laboratory maintaining records that identify the
person from whom the specimen was taken. 28 PA. CODE §§ 5.43, 5.52 (1986).
296. See Rothstein, supra note 38, at 429.
297. See P. BENSINGER, supra note 14, at 22.
298. See Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089, 1095 (D. N.J. 1985), affd, 795 F.2d
1136 (3d Cir. 1986) (discussed supra note 126). Whether test results might subject the em-
ployee to criminal liability has a definite impact on how courts scrutinize testing programs. See
supra notes 89-91, 150 and accompanying text. See also supra note 150.
299. See Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089, 1095 (D. N.J. 1985), aff'd, 795 F.2d
1136 (3d Cir. 1986) (discussed supra note 126); Hearings, supra notes 18, at 6 (Sept. 8, 1986,
10:00 a.m.) (written statement on behalf of the Pa. AFL-CIO); Rothstein, supra note 38, at
434-35.
300. Cf. Hanson, supra note 31, at 14 (companies with alcohol programs often find it
less expensive to treat and keep a worker than to hire a replacement).
301. Through such plans, employers aim to identify and rehabilitate employees with
substance abuse problems rather than simply tolerate or terminate them. The plans typically
offer a wide range of services that deal with problems that may hinder work performance. The
proliferation of employee assistance plans is due in large part to their claimed cost savings for
employers in the form of reduced health care costs and increased productivity. See generally
ALCOHOL & DRUGS, supra note 6, at 39-50 (discussing the role of employee assistance plans
in dealing with substance abuse by employees).
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and provide penalties for noncompliance by employers.8 02 Private
employees should be allowed to bring an action to enforce the provi-
sions of the legislation, with the violators held liable for costs, fees,
and damages related to such an action. 308 Criminal penalties might
also be provided.
VI. Conclusion
Urinalysis drug testing in the workplace has become an increas-
ingly common occurrence. Employers clearly have a legitimate inter-
est in maintaining a safe and productive workforce; however, em-
ployees should not be subjected to unreasonable drug testing.
Emerging federal case law indicates that the fourth amendment pro-
vides ample protection for public employees subjected to drug test-
ing. Protection for private employees, on the other hand, is specula-
tive at best. As a result, the dismissal of a private employee in
Pennsylvania for a refusal to take a drug test or on the basis of a
single unconfirmed test is likely to be immune from legal challenge.
Because existing laws in Pennsylvania do not adequately protect
private employees from unreasonable drug testing, legislation is re-
quired. Simply put, legislation would help to insure that workplace
drug testing is both reasonable and fair. As proposed in this Com-
ment, testing would be permitted only when based on reasonable sus-
picion and when provision is made for confirmatory testing and the
right to challenge test results. Allowing testing under such conditions
recognizes the legitimate needs of employers, while at the same time
provides a basic level of protection for the privacy interests of private
employees in Pennsylvania.
W. Scott Armington




San Francisco Municipal Code (Police Code)
Article 33A
Prohibition of Employer Interference with Employee
Relationships and Activities and Regulation
Of Employer Drug Testing of Employees (selected excerpts)
Sec. 3300A.1 POLICY.
It is the public policy of the City and County of San Francisco
that all citizens enjoy the full benefit of the right to privacy in the
workplace guaranteed to them by Article 1, Section 1 of the Califor-
nia Constitution. It is the purpose of this Article to protect employ-
ees against unreasonable inquiry and investigation into off-the-job
conduct, associations, and activities not directly related to the actual
performance of job responsibilities.
Sec. 3300A.2 DEFINITIONS.
(1) "Employee" shall mean any person working for salary or
wages within the City and County of San Francisco, other than
members of the uniformed ranks of the police, sheriff's and fire de-
partments, police department communication dispatchers, and any
persons operating emergency service vehicles for the City and
County of San Francisco.
Sec. 3300A.3 EMPLOYER INTERFERENCE IN PER-
SONAL RELATIONSHIPS OF EMPLOYEES PROHIBITED.
No employer may make, adopt, or enforce any rule or policy
forbidding or preventing employees from engaging or participating in
personal relationships, organizations, activities, or otherwise restrict-
ing their freedom of association, unless said relationships, activities,
or associations have a direct and actual impact on the employees'
ability to perform their assigned responsibilities.
Sec. 3300A.5 EMPLOYER PROHIBITED FROM TESTING
OF EMPLOYEES.
No employer may demand, require, or request employees to
submit to, to take or to undergo any blood, urine, or encepha-
lographic test in the body as a condition of continued employment.
Nothing herein shall prohibit an employer from requiring a specific
employee to submit to blood or urine testing if:
(a) the employer has reasonable grounds to believe that an
employee's faculties are impaired on the job; and
91 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SUMMER 1987
(b) the employee is in a position where such impairment
presents a clear and present danger to the physical safety of the
employee, another employee or to a member of the public; and
(c) the employer provides the employee, at the employer's
expense, the opportunity to have the sample tested or evaluated
by [a] State licensed independent laboratory/testing facility and
provides the employee with a reasonable opportunity to rebut or
explain the results.
In conducting those tests designed to identify the presence of
chemical substances in the body, and not prohibited by this section,
the employer shall ensure to the extent feasible that the test only
measure and that its records only show or make use of information
regarding chemical substances in the body which are likely to affect
the ability of the employee to perform safely his or her duties while
on the job.
Under no circumstances may employers request, require or con-
duct random or company-wide blood, urine or encephalographic
testing.
In any action brought under this Article alleging that the em-
ployer had violated this section, the employer shall have the burden
of proving that the requirements of Subsections (a), (b) and (c) as
stated above have been satisfied.
Sec. 3300A.8 ENFORCEMENT.
(a) Any aggrieved person may enforce the provisions of this
Article by means of a civil action. Any person who violates any
of the provisions of the Article or who aids in the violation of
this Article shall be liable to the person aggrieved for special
and general damages, together with attorney's fees and the costs
of action.
(b) Injunction.
(1) Any person who commits, or proposes to com-
mit, an act in violation of this Article may be enjoined
therefrom by any court of competent jurisdiction.
(2) An action for injunctive relief under this sub-
section may be brought by any aggrieved person, by the
District Attorney, or by the City Attorney, or by any
person or entity which will fairly and adequately re-
present the interests of the protected class.
SAN FRANCISCO MUNICIPAL CODE (POLICE CODE) pt. II, ch.
VIII, art. 33A (1985).
